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A recurring question in international criminal procedure is how
to ensure that prosecutors are held accountable for their errors and mis-
conduct. When International Criminal Court (ICC) judges encoun-
tered the first serious error by the prosecution in Prosecutor v.
Lubanga, they opted for an absolutist approach to remedies: the judges
stayed the proceedings and ordered the release of the defendant. Al-
though termination of the case was avoided through the intervention of
the Appeals Chamber, the standoff between the judges and the prosecu-
tion highlighted the dilemmas that the ICC faces in these circum-
stances. To protect the integrity of its proceedings, the court must order
remedies that effectively punish misconduct. At the same time, sweeping
remedies may harm other interests of international criminal justice,
including deterrence, retribution, and the establishment of an accurate
historical record.
In its more recent decisions, the ICC has acknowledged these com-
peting interests and weighed them in determining remedies for
prosecutorial misconduct. This Article argues that the court should
fully and openly embrace a balancing approach to remedies. Because of
the gravity and systematic nature of international crimes, it is essential
to recognize and accommodate the significant interests of the interna-
tional community and victims in preventing impunity and establish-
ing an accurate record of the crimes.
The balancing approach is not without shortcomings-it can be
unpredictable, and it risks weakening enforcement of defendants'
rights. To avoid these dangers, the court should take several concrete
steps in conducting the balancing analysis: specify clearly the factors
that will guide it; place special importance on the fair trial rights of the
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defendant; temper remedies only when a significant and legitimate
goal of the international criminal justice system warrants it; and fi-
nally, develop a broader range of responses to prosecutorial miscon-
duct, including sentence reductions, partial dismissals, fines, and dis-
ciplinary referrals. By applying a well-defined balancing analysis, the
ICC can achieve an approach to prosecutorial misconduct that is both
effective and able to accommodate the competing interests of interna-
tional criminal justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A recurring question in international criminal procedure
is the accountability of prosecutors for their errors and mis-
conduct. It was a question that troubled U.S. negotiators of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("ICC"),
and it is one that the ICC, now years after it has begun opera-
tions, has yet to resolve. Although ICC prosecutors have com-
pleted only one trial so far, their missteps have made headlines
and threatened to derail the progress of cases.2
How to respond to such prosecutorial mistakes is an issue
that continues to be debated even in well-established domestic
systems.5 But it has an added urgency at the international
1. Alison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 510,
514 (2003); David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal
Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 81-82 (2001-02).
2. Marlise Simons, For International Criminal Court, Frustration and Mis-
steps in Its First Trial, N.Y. TiEs, Nov. 22, 2010, at A12.
3. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REv. 869 (2009);
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
U. PA. L. REv. 959 (2009); David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Ac-
countability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility
Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONUNE
203 (2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-lawjournal-pocket-
part/volume-121; Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword- New Perspectives on Brady and
Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDozo L. REv. 1943
(2010).
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level. Because of the gravity of the crimes and the unique goals
of international criminal justice, the dilemmas presented by
prosecutorial misconduct are more acute.
In Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the ICC's first case, these dilem-
mas came to the fore before the trial had even begun. Thomas
Lubanga, a notorious Congolese militia leader, was charged
with war crimes for recruiting and using child soldiers.4 Sev-
eral months before trial, prosecutors informed the Trial
Chamber that they had discovered more than two hundred
documents containing potentially exculpatory evidence or evi-
dence material to the defense.5 Prosecutors could not, how-
ever, disclose the documents to either the defense or the
Chamber, because the documents had been obtained under
confidentiality agreements. The sources that had supplied the
documents to the prosecution-the United Nations and sev-
eral non-governmental organizations-had refused to grant
consent for any disclosure, even to the court. Prosecutors
averred that that they were acting in good faith and had re-
peatedly tried to obtain consent to reveal the documents. The
defendant responded that his fundamental right to receive ex-
culpatory evidence was violated and that the proceedings
should be stayed because no fair trial could occur under the
circumstances.6
After several unsuccessful attempts to resolve the conflict,
the Trial Chamber held that the prosecutor had violated the
Rome Statute to the point of undermining the foundations of
a fair trial. In particular, the Trial Chamber found that the
prosecution had violated the Statute in two ways: (1) by col-
lecting a significant amount of its evidence under confidential-
ity agreements, the prosecutor had misused the provision al-
lowing for the use of confidentiality agreements only in excep-
tional circumstances, as leads to other evidence that can be
4. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICCA01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, I 1 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl379838.pdf.
5. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Decision on
the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by
Article 54(3) (e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of
the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Confer-
ence on 10 june 2008, 1 17 (June 13, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc511249.PDF [hereinafter Lubanga, First Stay of Proceedings].
6. Id. 11[ 36-41, 43, 54.
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disclosed; and (2) the prosecutor had failed to comply with his
obligation to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to the
defense.7 The Trial Chamber therefore concluded that the
only appropriate remedy was to stay the proceedings indefi-
nitely and order the release of the defendant.8
The combination of these remedies, if actually imple-
mented, would have effectively ended the case. If the defen-
dant had in fact been released, it would have been unlikely
that the Court would have been able to regain custody of him.
Still, the Trial Chamber emphasized that it saw no realistic
prospect of the prosecution revealing the exculpatory evi-
dence, and therefore it viewed the stay as indefinite and the
release of the defendant as inevitable.9
The Chamber ordered the stay and release in full aware-
ness of the significant costs-to victims, who would not receive
a remedy for the wrongs they suffered; to the international
community, which created the ICC to punish and deter inter-
national crimes; and to the court's own goal of uncovering the
truth.' 0 But the court deliberately chose to set aside these com-
peting social and legal interests and instead focused solely on
the seriousness of the procedural violation. 1 It refused to con-
sider alternative remedies and, by effectively dismissing the
case, it opted for what one might call an absolutist approach to
remedies.12
Under the guidance of the Appeals Chamber, however,
the ICC has gradually adopted a more nuanced interest-bal-
ancing approach. When the prosecutor failed to disclose ex-
culpatory documents in Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber up-
held the stay of proceedings imposed by the Trial Chamber.
But contrary to the Trial Chamber's ruling, the Appeals Cham-
ber categorized the stay as merely conditional and temporary
7. Id. 1 75.
8. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 30 (July 2, 2008).
9. Id. 30-36.
10. Lubanga, First Stay of Proceedings, supra note 5, 95.
11. See id.
12. See Madhav Khosla, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?: A Re-
ply, 8 INT'L J. CoNsT. L. 298 (2010) (contrasting balancing and absolutist
approaches to human rights).
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and thus reversed the order to release the defendant.1 s This
decision gave the prosecution more time and impetus to reach
an agreement with the information providers, and it allowed
the trial to resume.' 4
Two years later, the Lubanga Trial Chamber imposed an-
other stay and again ordered the release of the defendant, in
response to a refusal by the prosecution to obey the court's
orders.15 The Appeals Chamber reversed both the order to re-
lease the defendant and the underlying stay of the proceed-
ings. 16 In justifying the reversal, the Appeals Chamber empha-
sized that a stay is an extreme measure that should be used
13. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment
on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I
Entitled "Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory
Materials Covered by Article 54(3) (e) Agreements and the Application to
Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues
Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008," 75 (Oct 21, 2008),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578371.pdf; Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 12, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecu-
tor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled "Decision on the Re-
lease of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo," 37, 45 (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578365.pdf.
14. The prosecution was able to reach an agreement with the informa-
tion sources to disclose the documents for ex parte review by the Trial Cham-
ber. Once the Trial Chamber was able to review the documents, it imposed
various measures to deal with potentially exculpatory documents that were
still confidential and could not be disclosed to the defense. It ordered the
prosecution to provide summaries, redacted documents, or analogous docu-
ments to the defense, and it lifted the stay once the prosecution complied.
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Reasons for Oral Deci-
sion Lifting the Stay of Proceedings, I1 25, 33-35, 59 (Jan. 23, 2009), http:/
/www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc622878.pdf.
15. In this instance, the Prosecutor refused to obey a court order to re-
veal the identity of an "intermediary" who had helped the prosecution con-
tact witnesses, but had allegedly bribed and coached some of these witnesses
to give testimony favorable to the prosecution.
16. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 18, Judgment
on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of
8 July 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Vari-
ation of the Time-Limit To Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Al-
ternatively Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU,"
1 62 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947768.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 17,Judgment on the
Appeal of Prosecutor Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber I of 15July
2010 To Release Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 1 27 (Oct 8, 2010), http://www.
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947862.pdf.
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only as a last resort.' 7 Accordingly, before imposing a stay, trial
judges should first consider alternative measures, such as fin-
ing the Office of the Prosecutor.' Alternative measures could
still ensure a fair trial, but would be less costly to other goals of
international criminal justice. Subsequent Trial Chamber deci-
sions have also recognized this point and have been more sen-
sitive to the various legitimate interests at stake.
Over time, the ICC appears to have moved away from
case-determinative remedies in response to violations of de-
fendants' rights. In doing so, it has acknowledged that provid-
ing relief to defendants, while important for vindicating fair
trial rights, can impair the court's ability to achieve other
goals, such as punishing international crimes, offering relief to
victims, and compiling an accurate historical record.
This Article argues that the court was correct to move to-
wards a balancing approach to remedies. The balancing ap-
proach does not always produce different or better outcomes
than the absolutist approach. For egregious violations of fun-
damental rights, for example, the outcome will often be the
same. But overall, the balancing approach tends to be more
sensitive to competing interests at the remedial stage. In evalu-
ating the optimal response to prosecutorial misconduct, the
court ultimately selects those remedies and sanctions that ef-
fectively deter misconduct and promote the fairness of the
trial while not sacrificing other legitimate goals of the ICC.'1
Critically, the balancing approach is also more transparent
and forthright about the considerations that motivate the
court's decision.
17. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 18, Judgment
on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of
8 July 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Vari-
ation of the Time-Limit To Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Al-
ternatively Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU,"
1 60 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947768.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Such goals include determining the truth about the crime, prevent-
ing and punishing international crimes, and respecting crime victims' rights
to receive a judicial remedy for their suffering. See infra Section III.A. For
other arguments in favor of the balancing approach to remedies at interna-
tional criminal courts, see Daniel Naymark, Violations ofRights of the Accused at
International Criminal Tribunals: The Problem of Remedy, 4 J. INT'L L. & INT'L
REL. 1 (2008); Sonja Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies": Remedial Deterrence
in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (2008).
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The balancing approach is not without shortcomings. In
the absence of clear standards, it can lead to inconsistent re-
sults and involve courts in controversial policymaking. If the
remedies chosen rarely affect the results of a prosecution, over
time, this can undermine the rights that remedies are sup-
posed to protect.
For the balancing approach to be meaningful and effec-
tive, it is important to structure the court's discretion and spec-
ify the factors that should guide it. The Article outlines several
concrete factors that the court could consult in choosing the
optimal response to prosecutorial misconduct. 20 These factors
could make the balancing analysis more predictable and mini-
mize concerns that judges would engage in illegitimate poli-
cymaking.
The court could first examine the extent to which the
prosecutor's violation prejudiced the defendant or harmed
the integrity of the proceedings. The focus of this inquiry
would be whether the violation has undermined confidence in
the verdict. The court could next examine whether the viola-
tion was deliberate, reckless, or negligent, and whether it was
an isolated incident or part of a pattern. In cases that may re-
sult in exclusion of the evidence, the court could also consider
the probative value of the evidence before deciding on the
remedy. Throughout this process, the court would be guided
by the principle of proportionality and choose a remedy that
advances legitimate goals of international criminal justice,
while imposing the least burden on individual rights.21 These
considerations could ultimately lead to an array of possible
sanctions and remedies, ranging from dismissal of a case for
20. See infra Section IV.C.
21. This approach follows the proportionality analysis that a number of
human rights and constitutional courts around the world use to reconcile
conflicting rights and interests. For a review of proportionality analysis, see
Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German ConstitutionalJurispru-
dence, 57 U. TORoNTo L.J. 383 (2007); Vicki Jackson, Being Proportional About
Pmportionality, 21 CoNsT. COMMENT. 803 (2004); Khosla, supra note 12; Julian
Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 174,
195 (2006); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Poportionality Balancing and
Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72 (2008); Stavros
Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 8 INr'LJ. CONST'L L.
468 (2009).
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the most egregious violations to fines and sentencing reduc-
tions for less extreme misconduct.22
If implemented in this fashion, a balancing approach
holds great promise. The court must respond effectively to
prosecutorial misconduct. But it must also be wary of imposing
sweeping remedies that threaten to wipe out the competing
goals of ending impunity for international crimes, uncovering
the truth about atrocities, and respecting victims' rights. This
Article offers a comprehensive and nuanced framework for de-
termining appropriate judicial responses to prosecutorial mis-
conduct at the ICC.
H1. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
AT THE ICC: FROM AN ABSOLUTIST TO A
BALANCING APPROACH
Despite their strong commitment to fair trial principles,
international criminal courts have not been immune to
prosecutorial misconduct. From the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to its sister tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL), international courts have sanctioned prosecutors for
disclosure violations,23 failures to comply with court orders, 24
22. I use "prosecutorial misconduct" and "prosecutorial error" inter-
changeably, as less cumbersome alternatives to the more precise term: "pro-
cedural violation by the prosecution." Although "misconduct" often suggests
a deliberate or grave violation, and error suggests an unintentional and less
serious violation, I use both terms without necessarily evaluating the serious-
ness of the violation or the culpability of the prosecutor in each particular
case. Prosecutors themselves are keen to distinguish between errors and mis-
conduct, but courts often use these interchangeably. E.g., Louise Arbour,
Legal Professionalism and International Criminal Proceedings, 4 J. INr'L CRIM.
JusT. 674, 677-82 (2006).
23. E.g., Prosecutor v. Orit, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Decision on Ongoing
Complaints About Prosecutorial Non-Compliance with Rule 68 of the Rules
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 13, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54 A-T, Decision on Kamuhanda's Motion
for Disclosure of Witness Statements and Sanction of the Prosecutor (Aug.
29, 2002).
24. E.g., Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Decision on
Two Defence Motions Pursuant to, Inter Alia, Rule 5 of the Rules and the
Prosecutor's Motion for Extension of Time To File the Modified Amended
Indictment Pursuant to the Trial Chamber II Order of 20 November 2000,
Warning to the Prosecutor's Counsel Pursuant to Rule 46(a) (Feb. 27,
2001).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2012] 183
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
prejudicial public statements, 25 and various other procedural
violations.26
The International Criminal Court has already had to con-
front many of the same problems. In the process, it has begun
to articulate a framework for sanctioning prosecutorial mis-
conduct and providing relief to defendants. As this Part ar-
gues, the ICC's approach to this issue has evolved from an in-
sistence on providing full remedies regardless of the costs to a
more nuanced and policy-oriented approach.
A. The Absolutist Approach
The early decisions of ICC trial chambers favored an abso-
lutist approach to remedies. Under this approach, once the
court concludes that a violation of certain rights has occurred,
it has to order a full and effective remedy, regardless of its
costs. The absolutist approach has a long legal tradition. It is
inspired by principles of corrective justice and was embodied
in the Roman law principle ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is
a right, there must be a remedy).27
At the international level, the absolutist approach to rem-
edies is prominent in the law on state responsibility and
human rights. 2 8 International human rights conventions typi-
cally require states to ensure that victims of rights violations
25. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Decision on Motion for
Disclosure of Evidence Underlying Prejudicial Statements Made by the Chief
Prosecutor, Mr. Stephen Rapp, to the Media, 1 30 (Feb. 9, 2009).
26. E.g., Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision
on the Prosecutor's Allegations of Contempt, the Harmonisation of the Wit-
ness Protection Measures and Warning to the Prosecutor's Counsel (July 10,
2001) (issuing a warning to the prosecutor for improperly revealing the
identity of defense personnel to the public); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case
No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Decision on Prosecutor's Motion To Correct the Indict-
ment Dated 22 December 2000 and Motion for Leave To File an Amended
Indictment, Warning to the Prosecutor's Counsels Pursuant to Rule 46(A)
(Jan. 25, 2001) (issuing a warning to the prosecutor for attempting to
amend indictment on her own, without judicial leave, and for failing to com-
ply with court orders).
27. Cf Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective justice and the Potential of Equity
in Constitutional Remedies, 33 Aiuz. L. REv. 859, 869 & n.40 (1991) (discussing
the long tradition of corrective justice and the ubi jus ibi remedium principle
in English and American law).
28. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs LAw 99
(1st ed. 1999); Starr, supra note 19, at 699-704.
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receive effective remedies.29 Human rights courts have often
interpreted "effective remedies" to mean full reparation and
to require an effort to make the victim whole.30 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice has similarly held that remedies must,
"as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been commit-
ted."31
In the same vein, the international criminal tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have "treated the 'right to
an effective remedy' as an absolute right, or nearly so" and
have refused to limit remedies "on the basis of countervailing
interests, such as the public interest in punishing major crimes
or other social welfare concerns."32 In these courts, "full repa-
ration" has generally meant dismissal of the case, retrial, or
exclusion of evidence. The International Criminal Court ini-
tially took a similarly absolutist approach toward remedies for
prosecutorial misconduct.
1. Stay of Proceedings
The International Criminal Court encountered procedu-
ral violations by the prosecutor in its very first case, Prosecutor v.
Lubanga. Relying on Article 54(3) (e) of the Rome Statute, the
prosecution in Lubanga had entered into confidentiality agree-
ments with the United Nations and non-governmental organi-
zations operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo
29. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 De-
cember 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (providing for the right to an effective remedy); American
Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, art. 25, OEA/ser.L/V/
11.23, doc. 21 rev.6 (1979) (same); European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, art. 13,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (same).
30. See, e.g., Caso de los 19 Comerciantes, Preliminary Objections, Inter-
Am.Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 93, 35 (June 12, 2002); Case of Veldsquez-Rodri-
guez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 11 62, 66 (July 29,
1988).
31. Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47
(Sept. 13); Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep.
Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 103, 1 161 (Nov. 30) (quoting Factory at
Chorzdw).
32. Starr, supra note 19, at 705.
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(DRC) to gather thousands of documents related to the case. 3
The agreements were very broad, promising to keep the infor-
mation confidential not just from the defense, but also from
the court.3 4 Several months before the trial was to begin, the
prosecution realized that some of the documents gathered in
this fashion contained potentially exculpatory information.
Prosecutors brought this to the attention of the court, and on
November 9, 2007, the Trial Chamber ordered the prosecu-
tion to disclose the potentially exculpatory documents.35 Pros-
ecutors began negotiating with the providers of the informa-
tion to obtain consent to disclose, but as late as June, 2008,
after several orders from the Chamber to disclose the informa-
tion, the prosecution was still unable to do so.36
Once prosecutors realized that consent to disclosure
might not be forthcoming, they began taking inconsistent po-
sitions on whether the evidence was in fact material to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. They began arguing that
some of the evidence initially identified as "potentially excul-
patory" was actually not material to the determination of guilt
or innocence.37 They also argued that other evidence was only
material "in principle," but not "in fact."38
As the prosecution's position changed over the course of
the months of arguments about disclosure, so did the Trial
Chamber's. The Chamber had initially held that if the prose-
cution possessed material exculpatory evidence that could not
be disclosed, the prosecution would be under an obligation to
withdraw any charges impacted by the nondisclosure.39 The
court had essentially left the remedy in the hands of the prose-
33. Article 54(3) (e) provides that the prosecutor may "[a]gree not to dis-
close, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information that the
Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the pur-
pose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information
consents." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 54(3) (e),
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
34. Lubanga, First Stay of Proceedings, supra note 5, 64.
35. Id. 15.
36. I 117.
37. Id. 1 20.
38. 1I 22.
39. M 1 6.
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cution, as the ICTY had done when faced with a similar prob-
lem.40
But as a result of the prosecution's changing positions,
the Trial Chamber lost faith in the prosecution's ability to de-
termine what constitutes material exculpatory evidence. The
judges were no longer confident that the prosecution would
properly discharge its duty to withdraw or amend charges. 41
The Chamber therefore opted for a more radical response. It
imposed an indefinite stay of the proceedings and ordered the
release of the defendant.
Following Appeals Chamber precedent, the Trial Cham-
ber held that a stay was appropriate when the rights of the
accused had been violated to such an extent that it was impos-
sible for him to obtain a fair trial.42 In such situations, "the
interest of the world community to put persons accused of the
most heinous crimes against humanity on trial, great as it is,
[was] outweighed by the need to sustain the efficacy of the
judicial process as the potent agent of justice."43
The Trial Chamber focused on the effect of the violation,
not the culpability of the prosecutor.44 The court concluded
40. Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and Discovery Before the International Crimi-
nal Court: The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. FOREIGN AFF. 207, 213
(2009).
41. Id. at 224 ("Finally, there are indications that during the course of
the Lubanga case the court simply lost confidence in the Prosecution, and at
the end of the day this may have been one of the biggest factors that pushed
the court towards its decision."). Perhaps adding to the problem was that the
undisclosed documents seemed to pertain to all the charges filed against
Lubanga (enlisting and conscripting child soldiers and using them to partici-
pate actively in the hostilities).
42. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-)1/04-01/06 (OA4), Judgment
on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against the Decision on the
Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court Pursuant to Article
19(2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, 1 37 (Dec. 14, 2006). Neither the
Statute nor the Rules mention a stay of proceedings as a remedy for viola-
tions of the right to a fair trial. Instead, the remedy was established by an
earlier decision of the ICC Appeals Chamber and was imported from inter-
national human rights law, which under Article 21 of the ICC Statute is a
source of law for the court. Id. 36, 39.
43. Id. 39.
44. A stay of proceedings may thus be ordered even if the prosecution
has acted in good faith, as long as its actions have seriously impaired the
defendant's rights. Lubanga, First Stay of Proceedings, supra note 5, 90.
Other international criminal courts have suggested that the court could pro-
vide certain remedies, such as sentence reductions, for violations in which
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that the failure to disclose potentially exculpatory documents
had rendered a fair trial impossible.45 Without examining the
documents at issue, the Chamber would be unable to ensure
that the verdict in the case was fair and accurate.
Although the violation occurred before trial, the Trial
Chamber concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of
the documents being disclosed. More than six months after
the court had ordered that the evidence be disclosed, the pros-
ecution had made no visible progress in its negotiations with
the information providers. Prosecutors had gone "no further
than raising the possibility that the Chamber may be provided
at some stage in the future with no more than incomplete and
insufficient materials."46 The court therefore concluded that
"the trial process ha[d] been ruptured to such a degree [that]
it [was] ... impossible to piece together the constituent ele-
ments of a fair trial."47
The Trial Chamber's opinion focused largely on the viola-
tion of the right to receive exculpatory evidence. At the same
time, the court made clear that the decision to stay the pro-
ceedings was based on another violation as well-the prosecu-
tion's misuse of Article 54(3) (e) in gathering evidence.48
Under Article 54(3) (e), the prosecution may use confidential-
ity agreements to gather information merely as a lead to other
evidence that can be used at trial.49 In Lubanga, the prosecu-
the prosecution had no involvement whatsoever, "but only where the illegal
conduct in question is such as to make it repugnant to the rule of law to put
the accused on trial." Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), Case No.
001/18-07/2007/ECCC/SC, AppealJudgment, 1 392 (Extraordinary Cham-
bers in the Courts of Cambodia, Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/
sites/default/files/documents/courdoc/Case%2000lAppealJudgementEn.
pdf. At the same time, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has suggested that the
culpability of the prosecutor may be relevant to the inquiry whether a seri-
ous violation has occurred. Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-OI/
04-01/10, Decision on the "Defence Request for a Permanent Stay of Pro-
ceedings," 5-6 (July 1, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl
102225.pdf.
45. Lubanga, First Stay of Proceedings, supra note 5, 11 91-94. In sup-
port, the court referred to human rights cases establishing that the right to
receive exculpatory evidence was an essential element of a fair trial. 1I 77.
46. MI 91.
47. Id. 93.
48. Id. 11 71-75.
49. See ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 54(3) (e); see also Lubanga, First
Stay of Proceedings, supra note 5, 1t 70-76; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case
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tion had ignored this requirement and had gathered
thousands of documents under confidentiality agreements,
fully intending from the outset to use some of the documents
at trial and not simply as leads.50 And although prosecutors
should have foreseen the conflict between their duties of con-
fidentiality and disclosure,5 ' they obtained most of their evi-
dence under confidentiality agreements, discounting concerns
about the potential legal difficulties this would create. It ap-
pears that ICC prosecutors were proceeding on the hope that
providers of the information would consent to disclosure and
thus eliminate any conflict.52 According to the Trial Chamber,
the overreliance by the prosecution on confidentiality agree-
ments was not merely a violation of Article 54(3) (e), but also
the root of the ultimate conflict between the duty of confiden-
tiality and the duty to disclose.
In justifying the stay of proceedings on two independent
grounds-the failure to disclose and the abuse of Article
54(3) (e)-the Trial Chamber left some ambiguity as to the
critical factors underlying the stay. It remains unclear whether
a stay would have been imposed if the prosecution had com-
mitted only one of the two violations at issue. But soon after
the.proceedings resumed, the Trial Chamber had another rea-
son to clarify its views on the conditions for a stay.
On July 8, 2010, the Lubanga Trial Chamber imposed a
second stay of the proceedings, after the prosecution deliber-
ately refused to comply with the Chamber's order to release
No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor
Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled "Decision on the Conse-
quences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article
54(3) (e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Ac-
cused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference
on 10 June 2008," 11 41, 55 (Oct. 21, 2008). Scholars disagree about the
validity of this interpretation of Article 54(3) (e). Some concur with the trial
and appellate decisions holding that the Article authorizes the prosecution
to collect only lead evidence, while others contest this interpretation as in-
consistent with other ICC Rules, "artificial[,] and unworkable." Compare Kai
Ambos, Confidential Investigations (Article 54(3)(e) ICC Statute) vs. Disclosure Ob-
ligations: The Lubanga Case and National Law, 12 NEW CIuM. L. REv. 543,
555-56 (2009), with Whiting, supra note 40, at 218-19.
50. Lubanga, First Stay of Proceedings, supra note 5, 1 27, 72-73.
51. See Whiting, supra note 40, at 209 (noting that the same conflict had
already arisen at the ICIY and was therefore highly foreseeable at the ICC).
52. Lubanga, First Stay of Proceedings, supra note 5, 1 25, 72.
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the identity of an intermediary whom the prosecution had
used to contact witnesses in the DRC.5 3 The prosecution ar-
gued that it could not comply with the order because disclo-
sure of the person's identity might jeopardize his safety.
Therefore, complying with the court's order would conflict
with the prosecution's statutory obligation to protect wit-
nesses.5 4
In its decision, the Trial Chamber noted that it had or-
dered the disclosure of the person's identity only after consult-
ing the ICC's Victims and Witnesses Unit about the necessary
protective measures and after taking into account all the cir-
cumstances, including the accused's rights to confront adverse
witnesses.55 The prosecution's deliberate refusal to follow the
court order meant that the prosecutor declined "to be
'checked' by the Chamber."56 As long as the Prosecutor per-
sisted in his refusal to comply, "the fair trial of the accused is
no longer possible, and justice cannot be done, not least be-
cause the judges will have lost control of a significant aspect of
the trial proceedings as provided under the Rome Statute
framework."5 7 Once the Chamber concluded that there was no
realistic prospect of a fair trial, it ordered a second stay of the
proceedings and the release of the defendant.
In both Lubanga decisions to stay the proceedings, judges
were well aware of the potential negative consequences that a
stay might have on the international criminal justice system. In
the decision concerning the failure to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence, the judges noted that they ordered the stay "with great
reluctance."58 The decision acknowledged that, as a result of
the stay, the court would "not make a decision on issues which
are of significance to the international community, the peo-
ples of the [DRC], the victims and the accused himself' and
"victims will be denied an opportunity to participate in a pub-
53. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Deci-
sion on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit To
Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively To Stay Proceed-
ings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, 1 31 (July 8, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc906146.pdf.
54. 1& 13-16.
55. Id. 11 12-17.
56. Id. 1 31.
57. Id.
58. Lubanga, First Stay of Proceedings, supra note 5, 95.
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lic forum, in which their views and concerns were to have been
presented and their right to receive reparations will be af-
fected."59 The judges stated that they were "acutely aware that
by staying these proceedings the victims have, in this sense,
been excluded from justice."6"
While the court mentioned the legitimate interests of vic-
tims, the DRC, and the international community, it did not
balance them against the interest in ensuring a fair trial. It did
not consider whether less drastic measures were available to
redress the problem. In the case concerning disclosure, for ex-
ample, the Trial Chamber could have: (1) forbidden the pros-
ecution to rely on evidence contradicted by the non-disclosed
evidence (an approach followed by the ICTY);61 (2) imposed a
conditional stay of the proceedings (the remedy ultimately im-
posed by the Appeals Chamber); or (3) imposed cumulative
daily fines on the prosecution until the evidence was disclosed,
perhaps followed by a conditional stay if fines proved unsuc-
cessful. 62 But these and other alternatives were not fully ex-
plored.63 Once the court determined that the violation was
sufficiently serious, it regarded an immediate and uncondi-
tional stay of proceedings, accompanied by the release of the
defendant, as the only possible consequence. It was an absolu-
tist approach, focusing solely on the defendant's rights and




61. Whiting, supra note 40, at 213.
62. The Appeals Chamber also identified various remedies that the Trial
Chamber could order after obtaining access to review the materials: "the
identification of similar exculpatory material, the provision of materials in
summarized form, the stipulation of relevant facts, or the amendment or
withdrawal of charges." Rod Rastan, Review of lCCJuiisprudence 2008, 7 Nw.
U.J. INT'L Hum. R-rs. 261, 275 (2009). The Prosecution had previously asked
for such alternative measures to be imposed instead of a stay, but the Trial
Chamber held that it could not grant such measures until it could review the
evidence and determine if it was in fact material and exculpatory. Id. n.39.
Ultimately, when the Trial Chamber was able to review the documents, it
imposed just such alternative measures. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06, Reasons for Oral Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings,
25, 33-35, 59 (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
622878.pdf.
63. See Rastan, supra note 62, at 275 n.39.
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2. Excluding Evidence
At the ICC, prosecutorial misconduct can also occur in
the process of gathering evidence, as the Office of the Prose-
cutor relies on its own investigators to collect much of its evi-
dence. Article 69(7) of the Rome Statute provides for the ex-
clusion of unlawfully obtained evidence. Exclusion is available
if: (1) the evidence was obtained in violation of the Statute or
internationally recognized human rights; and (2) the violation
"casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence," or
the "admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and
would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings."6
ICC Trial Chambers have so far ruled on motions to ex-
clude unlawfully obtained evidence in two decisions. The first
decision, concerning interrogations, adopts an absolutist ap-
proach to remedies, whereas the second, concerning searches
and seizures, takes an interest-balancing approach. This Sec-
tion discusses the first decision, which suppressed evidence ob-
tained as a result of an unlawful interrogation. 65
On December 17, 2010, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Katanga held that Congolese authorities had violated Germain
Katanga's right to remain silent." Specifically, the authorities
had not provided the accused with access to counsel and had
failed to offer other guarantees to ensure that the interroga-
tion respected his right to remain silent.6 7 The Congolese au-
thorities were not acting on the request of the ICC, and the
ICC prosecutor was not involved in the interrogation in any
way.68 Nonetheless, the Chamber concluded that because
Katanga's interrogation violated international human rights,
the statements obtained from the interrogation had to be ex-
cluded under Article 69(7).69
The Trial Chamber did not explain why exclusion fol-
lowed automatically. It is possible that judges believed the
statements were unreliable as a result of being obtained in the
64. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 69(7).
65. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Bar Table Motions (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc987504.pdf.
66. Id. 11 55-65.
67. I 55-56, 63.
68. I& 157.
69. Id 1 60, 62-63.
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absence of counsel. This would have been a proper ground for
exclusion, but the Chamber made no finding to this effect.
The decision appears to assume that admission of evi-
dence obtained in violation of international human rights is by
definition "antithetical to and would seriously damage the in-
tegrity of the proceedings." In other words, without elaborat-
ing on it, the Chamber collapsed the two prongs of Article
69(7) into one, rendering the second prong mere surplusage.
This reading appears inconsistent not only with the text, but
also with the drafting history of Article 69(7). Delegates to the
Rome Conference negotiating the ICC Statute expressly re-
jected a draft providing for automatic exclusion of evidence
gathered in violation of the Statute or other rules of interna-
tional law.70 Instead, they opted for a version that would re-
quire independent assessment of whether admitting the evi-
dence would seriously harm the integrity of the proceedings.
The Katanga Chamber, however, did not engage in such an
assessment.
The Chamber also refused to consider the probative value
of the defendant's statement.7' Once the Chamber concluded
that the statement was obtained in violation of human rights,
this automatically led to exclusion-the Chamber refused to
conduct any balancing and consider competing interests that
may favor admissibility. This decision is another example of
the absolutist approach to remedies.
Lubanga and Katanga were the ICC's first two cases. It is
possible that judges used strict remedies in these cases to solid-
ify their authority early on and to send a clear message about
the importance of obeying court orders. But Trial Chambers
have suggested that a stay of the proceedings may be imposed
again in the future, for a range of violations from "the material
mistreatment of the accused in order to obtain evidence (e.g.,
by use of torture) [and] the non-disclosure of significant ex-
70. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 1 39 (June 24, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf.
71. Id 64.
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culpatory evidence"72 to "delays in bringing the accused tojus-
tice, broken promises to the accused with regard to his prose-
cution and bringing the accused to justice by illegal or devious
means."73 The Katanga decision also leaves open the possibility
that exclusion of evidence may be ordered for any violation of
international human rights.
These decisions leave the impression that the absolutist
approach to remedies might continue to be broadly applied to
the ICC. But as the next Section discusses, other recent pro-
nouncements by both the Trial and Appeals Chambers suggest
that the court may be taking a different course.
B. The Balancing Approach
Several recent ICC decisions have taken a more nuanced
view to remedies for procedural violations. The court has be-
gun balancing legitimate social interests in deciding whether
and which remedy to impose.
The balancing approach to remedies has been adopted by
many national jurisdictions and can find support in certain in-
ternational law principles, such as proportionality. 74 Under it,
courts are willing to contemplate less than full remedies for
violations of human rights in order to fulfill competing legiti-
mate social aims.75 The balancing approach recognizes that
remedies such as dismissal, stay, retrial, and exclusion may im-
pose significant burdens on third parties and on the justice
system, and it takes these burdens into consideration when de-
termining the optimal remedy. For example, in deciding
72. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-1/04-01/06, Redacted Deci-
sion on the "Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceed-
ings," 1 195 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
1036342.pdf (noting that these are "clear examples" of violations that would
lead to a stay).
73. Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision
on the "Defence Request for a Permanent Stay of Proceedings," 6 (July 1,
2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docI102225.pdf. By contrast,
the prosecution's mischaracterization "of the specific nature of the procedu-
ral initiatives taken vis-A-vis [the defendant] by the German investigative au-
thorities" at the time of the prosecutor's application for a warrant was not a
sufficiently serious procedural violation to warrant a stay of proceedings, par-
ticularly since there was no evidence it was done in bad faith. Id. at 5-6.
74. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 19, at 704; Khosla, supra note 12, at 299.
75. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 591 (1983);
Starr, supra note 19, at 752-63.
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whether to exclude evidence, it may weigh the benefits of ex-
clusion-deterring official misconduct, compensating the de-
fendant for the violation of his rights, and safeguarding the
integrity of the justice system-against its costs-reducing the
court's ability to arrive at the truth, making it more difficult to
prosecute international crimes, and undermining victims'
rights to be heard and to receive an adequate remedy. The
International Criminal Court has recently begun to be more
mindful of these costs in its analysis of remedies.
1. Stay of Proceedings
In its 2008 decision staying the proceedings, the Lubanga
Trial Chamber refused to balance the competing interests af-
fected by the stay. But upon review several months later, the
Appeals Chamber recognized the need to seek less drastic
remedies and to leave open the possibility for the trial to pro-
ceed on the merits. The Appeals Chamber re-characterized
the stay as "conditional" and reversed the order to release the
defendant.76 The re-categorization of the stay ensured that the
court would be able to reach the merits of the case if the pros-
ecution were able to obtain consent to disclose the documents
to the Chamber." By the time the Appeals Chamber delivered
the judgment, an agreement had in fact already been
76. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment
on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I
Entitled "Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory
Materials Covered by Article 54(3) (e) Agreements and the Application To
Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues
Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008," f 4-5 (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc5 78 3 7 1.pdf; Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecu-
tor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled "Decision on the Re-
lease of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo," [1 44-45 (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578365.pdf.
77. The prosecution obtained the consent after assuring the providers
that the Chamber would treat the documents as confidential (an assurance
that the Chamber had given much earlier in the process and before the
initial stay) and after promising that it would take all protective measures
necessary, including withdrawal of the charges, in the event the Appeals
Chamber were to order the disclosure of documents without the providers'
consent Rastan, supra note 62, at 275-76 n.42.
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reached.78 The Trial Chamber accepted the agreement and
lifted the stay.
The Appeals Chamber embraced the balancing approach
more openly two years later, when it overturned the second
stay of proceedings in Prosecutor v. Lubanga. It held that the
court must first consider less drastic measures-such as sanc-
tions against the prosecutor-before ordering a stay of the
proceedings.79 The opinion emphasized that an indefinite stay
of proceedings imposes significant costs on the ICC's ability to
fulfill all of its purposes and that it should therefore be used
only as a last resort. In concluding that a stay was not appropri-
ate under the circumstances, the Appeals Chamber expressly
considered the social interests that favored a more moderate
response. These included the interests of victims and of the
international community "to see justice done," as well as the
interest of the accused in a final decision on the merits.80
Perhaps following the guidance of the Appeals Chamber,
the Lubanga Trial Chamber itself appears to have become less
absolutist in its approach to remedies. In 2011, at the close of
the prosecution's case in Lubanga, the defense alleged a pat-
tern of prosecutorial misconduct in the case and requested an-
other indefinite stay of proceedings. This time, however, the
Trial Chamber rejected the motion, reasoning that less drastic
alternatives to a stay were available to it.81 The alleged
prosecutorial misconduct included: (1) failure to check and
further investigate the statements of some of its witnesses; (2)
failure to "reveal the alleged weaknesses in the accounts of In-
termediary 316 and Witness 157";82 (3) a potentially deliberate
78. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Reasons for Oral
Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings, 1 13 (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc622878.pdf.
79. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 18,Judgment
on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of
8July 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Vari-
ation of the Time-Limit To Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Al-
ternatively Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU,"
1 61 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947768.pdf.
80. Id. [ 60.
81. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Deci-
sion on the "Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceed-
ings," 1 197 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc10363
42.pdf.
82. Id. 1 204.
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delay in disclosing evidence in a few instances; 3 and (4) fail-
ure to supervise, investigate, or control intermediaries who
were alleged to have bribed and coached witnesses to obtain
evidence favorable to the prosecution.84
The court concluded that even if these allegations were
true, a stay would not be warranted; instead, less costly correc-
tive measures would be more appropriate. The Trial Chamber
noted that, at the end of the case, it would review the instances
in which the prosecution may have been submitting unreliable
evidence, and it would weigh or exclude evidence as neces-
sary.85 The appropriate remedy for delayed disclosure would
also lie in the evaluation of the evidence at the end of the case
and the drawing of adverse inferences as appropriate.86 And if
the Chamber were to find the allegations about the in-
termediaries correct, it would similarly respond to the prob-
lem at the end of trial, by excluding or giving lesser weight to
any evidence procured unlawfully. The Chamber indicated
that it would consider whether the Office of the Prosecutor
was negligent in failing to supervise or control its in-
termediaries and failing "to act on indications of unreliabil-
ity."87
Finally, the Trial Chamber emphasized that it had taken
affirmative measures, in the course of the trial, to ensure that
evidence related to these defense allegations was sufficiently
explored. Intermediaries were called to testify, investigators
who were principally responsible for them also testified, and
83. The Chamber cited to five documents that were disclosed late and
one instance (the decision not to call Witness 157 in the Katanga trial) in
which the defense uncovered the information independently. The Chamber
reasoned that "the relatively limited instances of alleged deliberate non-dis-




86. Id. 1 212. In the common-law tradition, the drawing of adverse infer-
ences is frequently used as a remedy for the loss or destruction of evidence
by one of the parties. By analogy, it can be applied when the prosecution
purposely withholds a piece of evidence that it is required to disclose. As the
Chamber suggests in its Abuse of Process decision, it could also be applied,
perhaps with modification, in cases of delayed disclosure by the prosecution.
The Chamber could, for example, give lesser weight to belatedly disclosed
evidence.
87. MI 198.
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the prosecution was ordered to provide disclosure of all mater-
ials relevant to the intermediaries' conduct.88 These measures
made it possible for the Chamber to evaluate the defense's al-
legations that witness testimony was unreliable and that the
prosecution had negligently allowed such evidence to be intro-
duced. The Chamber could therefore exclude or give lesser
weight to any evidence that it found to be unreliable or tainted
by prosecutorial misconduct.89
On several occasions, the Trial Chamber emphasized that
a stay of proceedings was a "drastic" and "exceptional" remedy
that should be used only sparingly.90 As discussed earlier, the
Lubanga Trial Chamber has thus far treated the stay of pro-
ceedings as an indefinite suspension and ordered the release
of the defendant pursuant to the stay.9 In practice, the inabil-
ity of the court to ensure the reappearance of the defendant
means that an indefinite stay, combined with an order to re-
lease, effectively terminates the prosecution. In deciding
whether to impose a stay in 2011, the Lubanga Trial Chamber
recognized this effect of the stay, noting that it "must weigh
the nature of the alleged abuse of process against the fact that
only the most serious crimes of concern for the international
community as a whole fall under the jurisdiction of the
Court."9 2 Moreover, because the allegations of misconduct
"only related to one, albeit significant area of a wider case, it
would be a disproportionate reaction to discontinue the pro-
88. Id. 1 188.
89. Indeed, in its final judgment, the Trial Chamber determined that it
could not rely on any of the statements procured with the help of in-
termediaries. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 11 482-83 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl379838.pdf.
90. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Deci-
sion on the "Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceed-
ings," [ 189 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl0363
42.pdf. Although a stay guarantees the enforcement of fundamental rights, it
also has significant costs: "It brings proceedings to a halt, potentially frustrat-
ing the objective of the trial of delivering justice in a particular case as well as
affecting the broader purposes expressed in the preamble to the Rome Stat-
ute." Id. 1 165.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
92. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Deci-
sion on the "Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceed-
ings," 9 195 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl0363
42.pdf.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
198 [Vol. 45:175
POLICING INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS
ceedings at this juncture."93 In other words, in this more re-
cent decision, the Lubanga Trial Chamber seemed to be mov-
ing toward a balancing approach, placing a greater emphasis
on the competing interests at stake and on the need to con-
sider less drastic measures to remedy violations of the defen-
dant's rights.
2. Excluding Evidence
An even more open embrace of the balancing test is evi-
dent in the Lubanga Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers' decisions
to admit certain documents obtained in violation of the right
to privacy. The Pre-Trial Chamber addressed the admissibility
question when it confirmed the charges against Lubanga in
2007, while the Trial Chamber reexamined the question in
2009, when the prosecution sought to introduce the docu-
ments into evidence at trial. 4
The documents in question were seized during a search of
the home of a third party in the DRC. The search was con-
ducted by Congolese authorities, but in the presence of an
ICC investigator, who had been permitted to assist. The search
violated Congolese criminal procedure because it was con-
ducted in the absence of the owner of the premises. This viola-
tion of domestic law would not trigger exclusion under the
Rome Statute,95 but the search and seizure also violated the
internationally recognized right to privacy. Both the Pre-Trial
Chamber and the Trial Chamber in Lubanga held that Con-
golese authorities disproportionately invaded the right to pri-
vacy of the homeowner by indiscriminately seizing hundreds
of items, including documents that were not relevant to the
investigation.96
93. Id. 197.
94. The Pre-Trial Chamber's decision on admissibility came as part of the
confirmation of charges in 2007, a year before the Trial and Appeals Cham-
bers' decisions on the first stay of the proceedings in Lubanga. Subsequently,
the Trial Chamber issued its own decision on admissibility in 2009, one year
after the first stay of proceedings in Lubanga, but before the second stay,
which occurred in 2010.
95. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 69(8) ("When deciding on the rele-
vance or admissibility of evidence collected by a State, the Court shall not
rule on the application of the State's national law.").
96. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 81 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
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Although both Chambers found a human rights violation
that could trigger exclusion under the Rome Statute, both also
concluded that exclusion was not warranted. Following the
text of Article 69(7), the Pre-Trial Chamber first assessed the
effect that admitting the documents would have on the integ-
rity of the proceedings. It concluded that the privacy violation
was not especially serious and was therefore not likely to un-
dermine "the fairness of the trial as a whole."97 On the other
hand, the evidence was reliable and probative, and excluding
it would hinder the administration of justice.98 Balancing the
seriousness of the violation against the reliability and probative
nature of the evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that
exclusion was not justified.
In adopting this balancing approach, the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber followed the lead of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, the
ICTY's main precedent on the exclusionary rule, the ICTY
Trial Chamber concluded that "it would be utterly inappropri-
ate to exclude relevant evidence due to procedural considera-
tions, as long as the fairness of the trial is guaranteed."99 This
holding was expressly based on a consideration of the compet-
ing interests that the ICTY was meant to serve. The Tribunal's
mandate was not only to ensure the fairness of the proceed-
ings, but also to "bring to justice persons allegedly responsible
for serious violations of international law, to render justice to
the victims, to deter further similar crimes and to contribute to
the restoration of peace by promoting reconciliation in the
former Yugoslavia."' 00 Because exclusion of probative and reli-
able evidence would conflict with these goals, it would be or-
dered only for violations that seriously undermine the fairness
of the trial.
iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, Decision on the Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 38
(June 24, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf [here-
inafter Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges].
97. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 11 89-90.
98. Id
99. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Defence
"Objection to Intercept Evidence," 1 63 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 3, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/
031003.htm.
100. Id.
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Like the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber, the Trial Chamber
also concluded that exclusion of the documents was not justi-
fled, but for somewhat different reasons. The Trial Chamber
agreed with the Pre-Trial Chamber that exclusion does not au-
tomatically follow from a finding that evidence was obtained in
violation of international human rights. The Trial Chamber
noted that delegates to the Rome Conference negotiating the
ICC Statute had expressly rejected a provision that would have
mandated the exclusion of evidence gathered in violation of
international human rights.101 Instead, the language that the
drafters ultimately chose requires an independent evaluation
of whether admission of the evidence would be antithetical to
and would seriously damage the integrity of the proceed-
ings. 102
The Trial Chamber therefore first examined whether the
seizure seriously damaged the integrity of the judicial proceed-
ings. To do so, the Trial Chamber "balance [d] a number of
concerns and values found in the Statute." 03 The factors it
considered in the course of this balancing were somewhat dif-
ferent than those chosen by the Pre-Trial Chamber.
First, the Trial Chamber rejected the Pre-Trial Chamber's
holding that the probative value of the evidence should be
evaluated in deciding whether to admit the evidence. In sup-
port, the Trial Chamber pointed to the lack of any reference
to probative value in the text of Article 69(7). It noted further
that Article 69(7) was drafted intentionally to be different and
more specific than the broader ICC rule on admissibility of
evidence, which balances probity against prejudice.104 There-
fore, the Trial Chamber concluded that even if the evidence
was very probative, and even if "it alone provides proof of an
element of the charges," this should be irrelevant to the deci-
sion whether to admit it under Article 69(7).105
101. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 1 39 (June 24, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf.
102. See supra text accompanying note 70.
103. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 42 (une 24, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf.
104. Id 34, 43.
105. Id. 1 43.
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Similarly, the Trial Chamber concluded that the gravity of
the alleged crimes is not relevant to the admissibility of evi-
dence.106 In this respect, the Chamber departed from a num-
ber of national courts, which consider the seriousness of the
offense as a factor in the balancing analysis. 07 The Chamber
reasoned that the ICC has jurisdiction over "the most serious
crimes of international concern" and therefore all cases before
it would involve crimes of high seriousness. 08 For that reason,
the court did not find it appropriate to rank crimes by their
gravity and emphasized that Article 69(7) itself provided no
basis for such ranking.
Instead, the Trial Chamber examined three other factors
in deciding that the unlawful seizure did not seriously damage
the integrity of the proceedings. These included the gravity of
the procedural violation, the impact of the violation on the
rights of the accused, and the involvement in the violation by
the ICC prosecution.
When focusing on the gravity of the procedural violation,
the Trial Chamber reasoned that respect for the rights of the
person is not the only concern of international criminal jus-
tice. Rather, it has to be balanced against other core values of
the Rome Statute, such as "respect for the sovereignty of
States . . ., the protection of victims and witnesses and the ef-
fective punishment of those guilty of grave crimes."'0 The ef-
fective punishment of serious crimes makes it inappropriate to
exclude evidence obtained as a result of a minor procedural
106. Id. 44.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 133-34; see also Yves-Marie Moris-
sette, The Exclusion ofEvidence Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms: What To Do and What Not To Do, 29 McGiuL L.J. 521, 528-30 (1984)
(noting the relevance of the seriousness of the offense in decisions whether
to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence in Canada, Germany, Scotland, and
Australia); Thomas Weigend, Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WoRLD-
WIDE STUDY 243, 252 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007). But seeR v. Grant, 2
S.C.R. 353, 1 84 (2009) (Can.) (noting that while the seriousness of the of-
fense might be a valid consideration, "it has the potential to cut both ways").
108. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 1 44 (June 24, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf.
109. Id. 42 (quoting Orro TRIFFTERER ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NoTES,
ARTIcLE BY ARTIcLE 1335 (2d ed. 2008)).
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violation, as long as the overall fairness of the trial can be guar-
anteed.110
The Trial Chamber also considered the harm that the vio-
lation caused the defendant. The Chamber concluded that the
defendant should be allowed to challenge violations of a third
party's rights, because, presumably, such violations may affect
the integrity of the proceedings even if they do not directly
harm the defendant."'1 But because excluding the evidence
would compensate merely the defendant and not the third
party, the court seemed to worry about an unjustified windfall
to the defendant. Accordingly, while harm to the defendant
was not a dispositive factor, it was still relevant. Because no
demonstrable harm to the defendant was shown, exclusion was
less likely.
Finally, the Trial Chamber considered carefully the prose-
cutor's involvement in the unlawful search and seizure. The
court examined whether the prosecution played an active role
in the process leading up to the violation: Did the prosecution
control the process? Was it able to "prevent improper or illegal
activity"?112 The court also noted that, were prosecutors to be
involved in the violation, it would consider their culpability-
i.e., whether they had acted in bad faith.11s The court con-
cluded that it would not be likely to exclude evidence when, as
in the case at hand, ICC prosecutors did not participate in the
unlawful activity and would not be deterred by exclusion. 114
The Chamber concluded that the responsibility for con-
ducting the search rested entirely with the Congolese authori-
ties and that the ICC has no mandate to deter or punish illegal
conduct by domestic authorities.115
110. Id. 1 42.
111. Cf id. 37 ("The Statute establishes the benchmark that evidence
obtained otherwise than in compliance with internationally recognized
human rights standards (or in breach of the Statute) shall be excluded, if it
is potentially unreliable or would undermine the proceedings.").
112. Id. 46.
113. Id.
114. Id. 1 45-46.
115. Id. On the other hand, if actions by national authorities put the relia-
bility of the evidence into question, this may still lead to exclusion, even if
ICC prosecutors did not take part in the unlawful activity. See ICC Statute,
supra note 33, art. 69(7).
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The Lubanga Trial and Appeals Chamber decisions on ex-
cluding evidence and staying the proceedings suggest that the
ICC may be moving from an absolutist to a balancing ap-
proach to remedies. At the same time, the court has not ex-
plicitly renounced the absolutist approach or formed a consis-
tent framework for balancing. The next Part presents several
arguments why the court should firmly and openly adopt the
balancing approach to remedies for prosecutorial misconduct.
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE BALANCING APPROACH
A. Competing Goals of International Criminal justice
Remedies and sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct
serve multiple functions: compensating the defendant for the
breach of his rights, punishing prosecutors, condemning the
behavior as inappropriate, and deterring future miscon-
duct.116 Through these functions, remedies and sanctions for
prosecutorial misconduct help promote a central role of inter-
national criminal justice: to ensure fair trials and promote in-
dividual rights. But as this Section shows, promoting fair trials
and individual rights is not the only goal of the International
Criminal Court. The court also aims to punish international
crimes effectively and to establish the truth about these crimes.
The balancing approach to remedies can help the court ac-
commodate these sometimes competing goals.
International courts have repeatedly emphasized their
commitment to providing fair trials and protecting defend-
ants' rights.117 The U.N. Secretary-General found it "axiomatic
116. For a discussion of the differences between remedies and sanctions,
see infra Section IV.A.
117. E.g., Prosecutor v. Kordit, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, 1 242
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004), http://www.icty.
org/x/cases/kordicscerkez/acjug/en/cer-aj041217e.pdf; see also INrERNA-
TIONAL MILYTARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 101-02 (1947) (statement ofJustice Rob-
ert Jackson, Chief Counsel for the United States) ("We must never forget
that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the record on
which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned
chalice is to put it to our own lips as well."); Patrick Robinson, Ensuring Fair
and Expeditious Trials at the International Griminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, 11 EUR.J. INT'L. L. 569, 582-83 (2000) (detailing the statutory guaran-
tees of fair trials in the ICTY).
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that the International Tribunal [for the former Yugoslavia]
must fully respect the internationally recognized standards re-
garding the rights of the accused at all stages of its proceed-
ings." 18 Reflecting this, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes provide
that trials should be fair and conducted "with full respect for
the rights of the accused."119 The Rome Statute similarly pro-
vides that its provisions must be interpreted consistently with
international human rights law.120
More broadly, the mission of international criminal courts
is often described as spreading to national justice systems a
"human rights culture" and respect for fair trials. 121 In this
view, courts such as the ICC can lead by example and must set
the highest standards for the fairness of trials.122 Their ability
to model a steadfast commitment to human rights and the
rule of law is especially important for the countries most af-
fected by the courts' decisions, which are frequently struggling
to reestablish respect for the rule of law after the end of vio-
lent conflicts or authoritarian regimes.128 To the extent that
118. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para-
graph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 1 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993).
119. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 art. 20(1), May
25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 19(1), Nov. 8, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955.
120. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 21(3) ("The application and interpre-
tation of law pursuadt to this article must be consistent with internationally
recognized human rights. . . .").
121. Midan Damaika, Keynote Address at the Concluding Conference of
the International Criminal Procedure Expert Framework: General Rules and
Principles of International Criminal Procedure (Oct. 27, 2011) (on file with
author).
122. Yvonne McDermott, Rights in Reverse: A Critical Analysis of Some Inter-
pretations of Fair Trial Rights Under International Criminal Law, in ASHGATE RE-
SEARCH COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
(William A. Schabas et al. eds., forthcoming 2013); Theodor Meron, Procedu-
ral Evolution at the ICTY, 2 J. Irr'L CIuM. Jusr. 520, 524 (2004); Jens David
Ohlin, A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of
Law, 14 UCIAJ. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 77, 82-83, 103 (2009). The ability and
desirability of the ICC to set such standards has been the subject of some
debate in the literature, however. See, e.g., Fr6d6ric MCgret, Beyond Fairness:
Understanding the Determinants of International Criminal Procedure, 14 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 37, 76 (2009).
123. See Ohlin, supra note 122, at 103.
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the ICC is aiming to promote respect for human rights glob-
ally, it is important for the court to show that it takes fair trial
violations seriously. 124
If ensuring fair trials and spreading respect for the rule of
law were the only goals of international criminal justice, then
the absolutist approach to remedies may well be the optimal
one. 125 The emphasis on broad and strong remedies would
help minimize prosecutorial misconduct and ensure that ICC
proceedings provide as close to a fair model of justice as possi-
ble. Yet international criminal justice pursues multiple legiti-
mate goals, some of which may at times conflict with the goal
of ensuring maximum procedural fairness to defendants.
The International Criminal Court proclaims as its central
mission "to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of
[war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggres-
sion] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such
crimes."' 26 By prosecuting those most responsible for serious
human rights violations, international criminal courts strive to
affirm the rule of law, avoid collective recriminations, and pre-
vent violence from reoccurring.127 To the extent that deter-
124. Starr, supra note 19, at 713. A similar point was made by U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice Brandeis when he contemplated the value of excluding
unlawfully obtained evidence. He argued that exclusion was essential to
"maintain respect for law" and to "preserve the judicial process from con-
tamination." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting). He argued in favor of strong remedies such as exclusion
because of the negative message that the government would send if it failed
to discipline its own officers when they broke the law. The same argument
applies to the ICC and the messages it sends: like the U.S. government, if it
"becomes a lawbreaker, it [would] breed [ ] contempt for the law." Id
125. But see Starr, supra note 19, at 752-63 (arguing that the balancing
approach would be be preferable even in these circumstances, because it
would allow judges to candidly take into account the costs of remedies and
would reduce the likelihood that judges would interpret rights more nar-
rowly in order to avoid the imposition of costly remedies).
126. ICC Statute, supra note 33, pmbl.
127. Prosecutor v. Nikolit, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgement,
60 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003), http://www.
icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Blal-
kit, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Cro-
atia to the Issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 1 154 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 18, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/
tdec/en/70718SP2.htm;JUDrTH N. SHGAR, LEGALISM: LAw, MORALS, AND PO-
LYTIcAL TRIAis 158 (1964); Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Crimi-
nalJustice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1998).
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ring future violence and crimes depends on convictions of the
guilty, certain more drastic remedies (including dismissals,
stays of proceedings, and retrials), which frustrate prosecutors'
ability to obtain a conviction, may stand in the way of accom-
plishing this larger goal of the ICC.
International criminal courts, particularly the ICC, have
also stressed their commitment to honoring the rights and in-
terests of crime victims. Under human rights law, victims of
crime have the right to receive adequate judicial remedies for
the wrongs done to them. 128 The ICC has gone further and
acknowledged that victims also have a right to participate in
the court's proceedings.129 These rights of victims, however,
often come in tension with defendants' rights to receive ade-
quate remedies for violations of their own fair trial rights.
When a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct entails a perma-
nent stay or a dismissal, crime victims' interests in participating
at trial and seeing a resolution on the merits are bound to be
undermined. This presents another instance in which the
goals of international criminal courts may conflict.
Finally, international criminal courts have consistently af-
firmed that they strive to provide an accurate record about the
events they are adjudicating.13 0 At the national level, the
128. E.g., Kaya v. Turkey, Judgment, App. No. 22729/93 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Feb. 19, 1998), 86, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-58138. See generally JONATHAN DoAK, VicriMs' RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 159-71, 180-86 (2008) (discussing human
rights provisions granting victims of crime the right to justice and truth in
the investigation and prosecution of the case); SHELTON, supra note 28, at
14-37 (discussing provisions in regional and international human rights
treaties which guarantee the right to effective judicial remedies).
129. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 68(3). The provision emphasizes,
however, that victim participation must be exercised "in a manner which is
not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair
and impartial trial." Id
130. E.g., Prosecutor v. Nikolie, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judge-
ment, 1 60 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003), http:/
/www.icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Obrenovie, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, 1 19 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-sj03l2lOe.pdf. See generally LAWRENCE DouG-
LAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAw AND HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF
THE HOLOCAUST 257-61 (2005) (arguing that international criminal trials
can play an important role in documenting atrocities); Stuart Ford, A Social
Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Impli-
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search for the truth is also an important goal.131 But the em-
phasis on documenting the crimes and the context in which
they occurred is even more pronounced at the international
level because of the systematic nature, historic proportions,
and political underpinnings of the crimes. Although certain
remedies are fully consistent with this goal of international
criminal courts, others-such as exclusion of evidence or stay-
ing the proceedings-are less so.
Given these competing aims of international criminal jus-
tice, the absolutist approach to remedies appears too blunt a
tool. While it advances the goal of providing fair trials, the ab-
solutist approach often conflicts with other important commit-
ments of international criminal courts. Even at the domestic
level, many criminal justice systems have acknowledged that
the defendant's right to an effective remedy for the breach of
his rights must be balanced against other important public in-
terests, such as punishing crime or uncovering the truth about
the accusations.132
The need to accommodate these competing goals is more
pressing at the international level, given the extreme gravity,
broad scope, and systematic nature of the crimes. The public
interest in retribution and deterrence is greater in cases of se-
rious and widespread crimes. Many national legal systems rec-
ognize this point and adjust remedies depending on the grav-
ity of the crime. A classic German treatise on evidence cap-
tures the point vividly: "[T]he interest in solving high treason
or a murder is infinitely greater than the interest in investigat-
ing and punishing a cyclist who drives on the wrong side of the
cations for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 405, 472-75 (2012) (arguing that establishing an accurate historical re-
cord is one of the most important goals of international criminal courts).
131. E.g., Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, The Exclusion of Improperly Obtained
Evidence in Greece: Putting Constitutional Rights First, 11I wr'LJ. EVID. & PROOF
181, 186 (2007); Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?: A Ger-
man Perspective, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 167-70 (2003).
132. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, 86 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.
int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF;J.R. Spencer, Evidence, in EUROPEAN CRIMI-
NAI. PROCEDUREs 603-10 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds. 2002);
Giannoulopoulos, supra note 131, at 206-07, 211-12; Stephen C. Thaman,
Constitutional Rights in the Balance: Modern Exclusionary Rules and the Toleration
of Police Lawlessness in the Search for Truth, 61 U. TORONrO L.J. 691 (2011);
Weigend, supra note 107, at 252.
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road, or a sassy young man who gives his desire for singing too
long a rein during night time hours."133 When grave crimes
are also widespread and systematic, the public interest in pros-
ecution and trial on the merits is even stronger, and a remedy
that extinguishes the possibility for such a trial becomes less
acceptable. 13 4
B. Practical Difficulties of International Prosecutions
For practical reasons, remedies for prosecutorial miscon-
duct are also typically more costly at the international than at
the national level. International prosecutions are generally
more complex, more expensive, and more difficult to accom-
plish than domestic prosecutions. In that context, certain rem-
edies, such as dismissals, retrials, stays of proceedings, and ex-
clusion of evidence, are also likely to be more damaging to the
prosecution than equivalent remedies would be at the domes-
tic level.
International prosecutions typically occur years after the
crimes were committed and far from the place where the
crimes occurred. They often require enormous infrastructure
to accommodate work across different countries, cultures and
laws, and involve witnesses who are severely emotionally trau-
matized, concerned about their safety, and often unwilling to
testify.1 35 International prosecutions are also very complex be-
133. ERNST BELING, DIE BEwEIsvERBOTE AIs GRENZEN DER WAHRHEIT-
SERFORSCHUNG IM STRAFPROZESs (1903), quoted and translated in Thaman,
supra note 132, at 732.
134. Some have argued that gravity should be irrelevant to the determina-
tion of remedies, because the more serious the charges, the higher the
stakes for the defendant, and therefore the greater his interest in receiving a
full remedy for violations of his rights. Thaman, supra note 132, at 732. But
even though the stakes are indeed higher for international crimes defend-
ants, it does not follow that the pressing public interests in prosecution of
grave crimes are simply canceled out and that the gravity of the crimes
should not be considered at all. The balancing approach would allow courts
to consider gravity on both sides of the scale on a case-by-case basis. Another
criticism of considering gravity with respect to remedies for misconduct is
that it will dilute the protection of the underlying rights. See, e.g., Yale
Kamisar, 'Comparative Reprehensibility' and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1987). I address this criticism in Section III.D.
135. Starr, supra note 19, at 716; Alex Whiting, In International Criminal
Prosecutions, justice Delayed Can Be justice Delivered, 50 HARv. INT'L L. J. 323,
336-37 (2009).
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cause they concern mass atrocities occurring on a vast geo-
graphic scale and require uncovering the operations of for-
eign and often secretive political and military structures. A typ-
ical international prosecution costs millions of dollars and lasts
several years.13 6 Accordingly, at least one remedy-retrial-is
often likely to be prohibitively expensive. 37
International prosecutions are not only costly, but also
difficult to pursue effectively. In addition to being legally and
factually complex, they are often politically charged and occur
in volatile and unsafe regions. Such prosecutions target power-
ful political and military leaders and occur during or immedi-
ately after a violent conflict or a major political transition. Na-
tional authorities, who would normally be best equipped to
gather evidence, are generally unwilling or unable to cooper-
ate with international prosecutors.138 Under these circum-
stances, it is much more difficult for prosecutors to make up
for a piece of excluded evidence or to handle a retrial. 39 Simi-
larly, it is difficult to ensure the reappearance of a defendant
once he has been released as a result of a stay of the proceed-
ings.140 In addition, some national authorities may become en-
tirely uncooperative if they perceive that the international
court is releasing a defendant "on a technicality." 41
136. Whiting, supra note 135, at 340; David Wippman, Notes and Com-
ments, The Costs ofInternational justice, 100 Am. J. INTL L. 861, 872-77 (2006).
137. International tribunals have ordered a retrial only twice so far.
Muvunyi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Judgement, 1 171 (Aug.
29, 2008) (quashing conviction and ordering retrial); Prosecutor v.
Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-A, Judgement, 1 377 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former YugoslaviaJuly 19, 2010) (ordering a partial retrial after the prosecu-
tion appealed an acquittal).
138. See Whiting, supra note 135, at 335-36.
139. Of course, this is not to deny that even in national jurisdictions, the
exclusion of evidence often leads to dismissal of the prosecution. This is
most common in simple possession or distribution cases, however, and is less
likely to occur in cases of higher complexity (more similar to those at the
international criminal courts), where the prosecution's case rests on multi-
ple pieces of evidence.
140. See supra text accompanying note 9.
141. See Starr, supra note 19, at 717. When the ICTR Appeals Chamber
ordered the release of Barayagwiza on the grounds that he had been im-
properly detained for several months, the Rwandan government threatened
to cease cooperating with the Tribunal. This would have prevented the Tri-
bunal from continuing its prosecutions, so the Chamber issued a new deci-
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For all these reasons, remedies such as retrials, exclusion
of evidence, or a stay of proceedings and release of the defen-
dant are often more damaging to the prosecution at the inter-
national level than at the domestic level. International crimi-
nal courts can therefore benefit greatly from the balancing ap-
proach, which would allow them to select more flexible and
less drastic responses to prosecutorial misconduct.
C. Transparency and Inclusiveness
The balancing approach has another important advan-
tage: it requires judges to expose and defend the interests they
consider in determining remedies.142 Under the absolutist ap-
proach, the court essentially declares one right or interest the
winner and elevates it above all other interests for an indefi-
nite period of time. In effect, judges are "freezing in place a
prior act of balancing."143 By contrast, balancing courts openly
consider and reconsider relevant rights and interests in each
case, which makes it easier to review, challenge, and reform
doctrine as needed.
Balancing courts are also less likely to engage in "remedial
deterrence."144 Remedial deterrence occurs when courts are
faced with remedies that are inordinately costly to legitimate
public interests, and judges are reluctant to separate remedies
from the underlying right. Instead, judges sympathetic to the
legitimate interests at stake might constrict the scope of indi-
vidual rights and conclude that there is no violation of the
right and no relief is warranted. As Sonja Starr has docu-
mented, the ICTY and ICTR frequently engaged in such reme-
dial deterrence.145
sion, suggesting that the proper remedy was in fact sentence reduction or,
should Barayagwiza be acquitted, financial compensation. Id.
142. SeeJackson, supra note 21, at 831-32 (making the same point about
proportionality analysis); Sweet & Mathews, supra note 21, at 77 (same).
143. Sweet & Mathews, supra note 21, at 87-88.
144. See Starr, supra note 19. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essential-
ism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 CoLUM. L. REv. 857, 889-99 (1999) (dis-
cussing remedial deterrence and arguing that "remedial consequences exert
an important influence over the shape and existence of constitutional
rights").
145. Starr, supra note 19, at 720-24; see also Guido Calabresi, The Exclusion-
ary Rule, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111 (2003) (making a similar point in
the context of U.S. criminal procedure).
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Over the long term, "remedial deterrence" likely curtails
defendants' rights. While a few defendants benefit from broad
remedies for violations of their rights, many others are denied
even the mere recognition that their rights were violated. This
sets back not only the cases of individual defendants, but also
the development of legal doctrine on fair trial rights. In short,
even under an absolutist approach, the costs of remedies are
bound to influence the court's decision-making, but under
that approach, the influence is simply not openly acknowl-
edged.
Under the balancing approach, by contrast, when judges
find that they must restrict remedies, they do so openly and
provide reasons for awarding less than complete relief. When
judges are straightforward about the values that motivate their
decisions and about the interpretative methods they employ to
derive these values, they open up a broader space for delibera-
tion and contestation that can ultimately be useful to interna-
tional criminal justice. At the international level, there is no
democratically elected legislature that can revisit the weight
given to different rights and interests in specific cases. For that
reason, it is especially important for ICC judges to be transpar-
ent about the values motivating their decisions. This allows for
public review and criticism of their decisions, and ultimately,
for broader legitimacy of the court's work.146
Greater legitimacy stems not only from the transparency
of the balancing approach, but also from its inclusiveness. By
openly addressing competing interests in its decisions, the
court signals to all the parties affected that their concerns will
be considered. For example, if a balancing court imposes a
costly remedy, such as a stay of the proceedings, it would none-
theless engage the parties representing opposing public inter-
ests (e.g., the victims and the prosecutor) and acknowledge
that they have legitimate claims on their side. The court can
therefore "credibly claim that it shares some of the loser's dis-
tress in the outcome."' 47 In the process, the court also rein-
forces the legitimacy of resolving value conflicts through rea-
soned deliberation in a court of law.
146. Cf Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies,
41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 107, 153-59 (2009) (asserting that, in inter-state
disputes, an international court's transparency bolsters its credibility).
147. Sweet & Mathews, supra note 21, at 89.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
212 [Vol. 45:175
POLICENG INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS
D. Responding to Criticisms of Balancing: Structuring Discretion
The balancing approach is inclusive, transparent, and ac-
commodating of multiple goals of international criminal law.
But it is not without flaws. Criticism typically falls into two prin-
cipal categories.
First, the balancing approach is criticized for allowing
courts to make policy on questions that are the province of
legislatures.148 On this account, the balancing approach au-
thorizes judges to revalue competing interests which the legis-
lature has already weighed in the process of defining individ-
ual rights. For example, when legislators determine the per-
missible length of detention before a suspect is presented to a
judge, they have already balanced the suspect's liberty interests
against society's interest in punishing crime effectively. When
a suspect is detained for an unduly long period before present-
ment to a judge, and a court awards less than complete relief
for that violation, this arguably disturbs the balance between
liberty and security chosen by the legislature in codifying the
right.149
But what seems like judicial policymaking to some can in
fact be explained as a gap-filling interpretative exercise. When
defining rights, legislatures often fail to specify the remedies
that follow when these rights are violated. For example, a stat-
ute may provide for promptjudicial review after detention, but
fail to indicate what remedies should be imposed when a per-
son is detained for an unreasonably long period before pre-
sentment. Since the legislature has essentially left this issue un-
resolved, courts have to fill the gap through interpretation-
an exercise that courts engage in whenever a statutory provi-
sion is ambiguous, whether it concerns rights, duties, or reme-
dies.
If the legislature wishes to restrain the judges' interpreta-
tive discretion, it can always do so. It can specify the remedies
warranted for a particular violation, or at least outline a partic-
ular approach toward remedies. At the ICC, the Assembly of
States Parties (which, albeit not democratically elected, has the
power to adopt rules of procedure for the ICC) could lay out
concrete factors that judges must consider in choosing the
148. See Gewirtz, supra note 75, at 607; Tsakyrakis, supra note 21, at 470.
149. Gewirtz, supra note 75, at 607.
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type and level of remedy for, say, disclosure violations or viola-
tions of the right to counsel. Some national legislatures have
already done so, for example, by outlining the factors that
courts should take into account when deciding whether to ex-
clude unlawfully obtained evidence. 50
The second criticism of the balancing approach presents
a more forceful challenge. If courts regularly provide incom-
plete relief for procedural violations, over time, they might di-
lute the value and meaning of the underlying right.1'5 This
would be especially true if "psychologically, judges ... system-
atically undervalue individual rights if allowed to balance them
against broad social interests."' 52 Some of the studies of the
balancing approach to remedies in the United States suggest
that this is a real possibility.' 53
To avoid such dilution, scholars have proposed that the
individual right violated must be given special weight in the
balancing analysis.' 54 Under this view, a fundamental right,
such as the right to obtain exculpatory evidence, would be as-
signed a greater value in the balancing process than compet-
ing social interests. Only especially weighty public interests
could overcome individual rights, and fundamental rights
would rarely be trumped by countervailing interests.
But simply stating that courts ought to place a special em-
phasis on individual rights may not provide sufficient guidance
to courts and may leave the protection of rights too indetermi-
nate. Instead, this Article proposes several more concrete steps
that a court such as the ICC can take to structure judges' dis-
cretion.
150. Evidence Act 2006 § 30 (N.Z.).
151. Gewirtz, supra note 75, at 607-08; Roach, supra note 27, at 862-83,
895; David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILu.. L. REv. 1199, 1212; Tsakyrakis, supra note 21,
at 470.
152. Gewirtz, supra note 75, at 607-08.
153. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 27, at 895 (noting that American courts
have used the slogan of the equitable, or balancing, approach to minimize
rights claims of disadvantaged groups); Rudovsky, supra note 151, at 1212,
1254 (noting that courts have limited the enforcement of civil rights by de-
nying more serious remedies and instead pointing to the availability of less
drastic alternative remedies).
154. Gewirtz, supra note 75, at 607; Starr, supra note 19, at 759 .
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First, the court must develop a broad palette of remedies
and sanctions that judges can choose from, to ensure that pro-
portionate relief is available in most cases. As the next Part
discusses in greater detail, in addition to exclusion of the evi-
dence, stay of the proceedings, and dismissal of the case,
judges should also have the option of employing less costly re-
sponses to misconduct, such as sanctioning prosecutors, dis-
missing individual charges, and reducing the defendant's sen-
tence.
Second, in its decisions, the court must clarify the factors
relevant to balancing in order to make the analysis more trans-
parent, predictable, and capable of review. These factors in-
clude the harm to the defendant's rights or the integrity of the
proceedings; the culpability and level of involvement of ICC
prosecutors; the extent to which the violation was an isolated
occurrence or part of a pattern; and the probative value of any
evidence obtained as a result of the procedural violation. The
court may conclude that other factors will also be relevant, but
this list would be an appropriate starting point.
Third, the court should examine alternative remedies and
sanctions and determine whether a less restrictive measure
may be available in a particular case. If several remedies are
available, and all serve to advance important goals of interna-
tional criminal justice, but one is less costly to individual rights
and the integrity of the judicial process, the court must opt for
that less restrictive remedy.
Finally, the court must openly and straightforwardly state
and weigh the competing values that influence its analysis. If it
decides to restrict a remedy, it must explain how doing so ad-
vances a goal of international criminal justice and why this
benefit outweighs any loss to individual rights. Alternatively, if
it awards a full remedy despite a significant harm to public
interests, it must justify this balance in a reasoned decision.
Part IV discusses in greater detail this framework for a struc-
tured balancing approach.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE BALANCING APPROACH
A. Expanding the Range of Remedies
In response to prosecutors' errors and violations, the
court can choose one of two principal responses: a remedy or
a sanction. Remedies aim not only to punish and deter the
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misconduct, but also to repair to some degree the harm done
to the defendant. 5 5 By contrast, sanctions focus primarily on
punishment and deterrence. The distinction between the two
is not always straightforward, however. Some remedies, such as
declaratory judgments, offer only symbolic relief to the defen-
dant. Conversely, sanctions may at times also provide some re-
lief to the defendant by recognizing the harm done to him
and punishing the errant prosecutors. Ultimately, both reme-
dies and sanctions aim to protect the integrity of the proceed-
ings. Despite these similarities, the formal distinction between
remedies and sanctions persists in the case law of the ICC and
in the academic literature. 56 This Part therefore analyzes rem-
edies and sanctions separately, while ultimately recognizing
that they are alternative and complementary means of address-
ing prosecutorial misconduct.
The Rome Statute currently provides only three remedies
for procedural violations: termination of the proceedings, 57
compensation,15 8 and exclusion of evidence.' 59 As discussed in
Part II, through its jurisprudence, the court has begun ex-
panding the remedies available for procedural violations by
prosecutors. Drawing on human rights jurisprudence, the ICC
has developed a remedy of staying the proceedings. And read-
ing broadly its powers to evaluate the evidence, at least one
Trial Chamber has stated that it could draw negative eviden-
tiary inferences from failures by prosecutors to comply with
their obligations under the Statute.
155. E.g., SHELTON, supra note 28, at 38-43; Rudovsky, supra note 151, at
1211.
156. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 18,
Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial
Chamber I of 8 July 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent
Request for Variation of the Time-Limit To Disclose the Identity of Interme-
diary 143 or Alternatively To Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consulta-
tions with the VWU," 1 60 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc947768.pdf; STEPHEN GILLERs, REGULATION OF LAwVERs: PROBLEMS
OF LAW AND ETHics 834 (6th ed. 2002); Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prose-
cutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L.
REv. 69, 78-79 (1995); PeterJ. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 827 (1999).
157. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 85(3) (implying that termination may
be a remedy for grave and manifest injustice).
158. Id. art. 85.
159. Id. art. 69(7).
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To make the interest balancing approach more meaning-
ful and effective, the court ought to develop an even broader
set of remedies for procedural violations. In addition to the
more drastic measures such as dismissal of the case and stay of
proceedings, the court could consider remedies such as dis-
missals of select counts, sentence reductions, and declaratory
relief. It could also apply more frequently the more moderate
remedies it has developed in its case law, including negative
evidentiary inferences and conditional stays of the proceed-
ings. As Section IV.B elaborates, the court could also broaden
the use of sanctions, such as fines and disciplinary referrals, as
a response to procedural violations by the prosecution. These
alternatives would allow the court to respond effectively to
prosecutorial misconduct without unduly jeopardizing other
goals of international criminal justice.
1. Sentence Reductions
A remedy that is not expressly contemplated by the Rome
Statute, but that could be beneficial to the ICC, is sentence
reduction. Other international criminal courts, including the
ICTR and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cam-
bodia (ECCC), have already granted sentence reductions to
redress violations of defendants' rights. Although these courts'
statutes do not expressly authorize sentence reductions, judges
have exercised their "inherent powers" to provide such reduc-
tions as "effective remed[ies]" for violations of defendants'
rights. 160
So far, sentence reductions have been used exclusively to
redress unlawful detentions before trial. In one case, the ICTR
awarded a six-month sentence reduction in response to a viola-
tion of the defendant's right to be promptly informed of the
charges against him.16' In two others, the Tribunal reduced
life imprisonment sentences to 45 and 35 years, respectively, to
remedy unlawful pretrial detentions.162
160. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgement, 11
251-52, 322-24 (May 23, 2005), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/En-
glish/Kajelijeli/judgement/appealsjudgement.doc.pdf.
161. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement and Sen-
tence, 11 579-80 (May 15, 2003), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/
English/Semanza/decisions/index.pdf.
162. Kajelijei, 1 251-52, 322-32 (reducing a sentence of two terms of life
imprisonment to 45 years as a remedy for the defendant's unlawful pretrial
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In determining whether to award a sentencing reduction
and how long the appropriate reduction should be, the ICTR
has considered three key factors: (1) the seriousness of the vio-
lation of the accused's rights; (2) the extent to which the viola-
tion was the fault of the Prosecution or the Tribunal; and (3)
the prejudice to the accused.163 With respect to the first factor,
seriousness of the violation, the ICTR looked to the length of
the unlawful detention of the accused. To measure the second
factor, the fault of the prosecutor, the ICTR considered the
extent to which unlawful detention was attributable to actions
by national authorities and thus to circumstances beyond the
ICTR prosecutor's control. Even when national authorities
were primarily responsible for the delay, the Tribunal still con-
sidered whether the international prosecutor "failed to effect
its prosecutorial duties with due diligence." 164 Finally, in deter-
mining the prejudice to the defendant, the court considered
whether the defense itself had contributed to the delayl 65 and
whether the court had taken measures to mitigate the effects
of the violation.166
The ECCC Trial Chamber also reduced a defendant's sen-
tence for a violation of his right to a speedy trial.167 The defen-
dant, Kaing Guek Eav (also known as Duch), had been unlaw-
fully detained by the Cambodian Military Court for eight years,
far longer than allowed under the law. After holding that the
lengthy detention violated the defendant's right to a speedy
trial, the Trial Chamber reduced his sentence from 35 to 30
detention); Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision
(Prosecutor's Request for Review of Reconsideration), 1 75 (Mar. 31, 2000),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs
20000331.pdf (holding that appropriate remedy in the event of acquittal
would be compensation and in the event of conviction-sentence reduc-
don). Barayagwiza's sentence was eventually reduced from life imprison-
ment to 35 years. Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement
and Sentence, 11 1106-07 (Dec. 3, 2003), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/
0/Case/English/Nahimana/judgement/Judg&sent.pdf.
163. Semanza, 11 579-80.
164. Kajehjei, 251-53.
165. Semanza, if 579-80; Barayagwiza, 1 54-58, 61-62, 71.
166. Semanza, It 579-80.
167. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), Case No. 001/18-07/
2007/ECCC, Trial ChamberJudgement, 1 624 (Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia July 26, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/courtdoc/20100726judgementCase_001_ENG_
PUBLIC.pdf.
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years of imprisonment.'6s The reduction was overturned on
appeal, however, because the fault for the excessively long de-
tention was attributed entirely to Cambodian authorities,
rather than to the ECCC.169 For the Appeals Chamber, the
lack of direct involvement by the ECCC prosecution was a dis-
positive factor.
A number of national jurisdictions, both in the common-
law and civil-law tradition, have also used sentence reductions
as a remedy for procedural violations,o70 and the European
Court of Human Rights has expressly recognized that national
authorities can afford "adequate redress" by "reducing the ap-
plicant's sentence in an express and measurable manner"
where the right to a hearing within a reasonable time or the
right to be brought promptly before a judge has been vio-
168. Id. 11 631-32. The Trial Chamber explained that it was guided by
the principle that the reduction should "be express and measurable and
based on the totality of the circumstances of the case." Id. 625.
169. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), Case No. 001/18-07/
2007/ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgement, 11 392-99 (Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/courdoc/Case%20001AppealJudgementEn.pdf.
Two judges dissented from the Appeals Chamberjudgment on this point. Id.
1 3-20 (partially dissenting joint opinion ofJudges Klonowiecka-Milart and
Jayasinghe).
170. See, e.g., Eckle v. Germany, App. No. 8130/78 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jul. 15,
1982), 1 33, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57476 (quoting the German Federal Court of Justice as stating that
"[e]xcessive length of criminal proceedings may. . . constitute a special miti-
gating circumstance ... [and] that the spirit of the law would be lost sight of
... if, when determining sentence, this circumstance were not clearly (deut-
lich) taken into account"); Salah v. Netherlands, App. No. 8196/02 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (July 6, 2006), 30-40, 74, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-76256 (discussing Dutch cases that applied sen-
tence reduction as a remedy for state misconduct); Beck v. Norway, App. No.
26390/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 26, 2001), 1 14, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59527 (quoting the City Court on the
three mitigating factors considered in determining the sentence, including
the long time between when the crime was committed and when the trial
was held); Yetkinsekerci v. United Kingdom, App. No. 71841/01 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (Oct. 20, 2005), 8, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-70729 (quoting the U.K. Court of Appeal as holding that
it was reducing the sentence from the 18 to 12 years in light of the excessive
time taken for the appeal of the sentence); R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] 1 S.C.R.
206, I 53 (Can.) (holding that a sentence may "be reduced in light of state
misconduct even when the incidents complained of do not rise to the level
of a [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms] breach").
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lated.17' The factors considered as relevant to the determina-
tion of sentence reductions vary somewhat from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but, like the ICTR and the ECCC, national courts
typically examine the seriousness of the violation, the culpabil-
ity of state actors, and the prejudice to the defendant, among
other factors.
Sentence reductions can offer an attractive alternative to
more drastic remedies, such as releasing the defendant and
dismissing the charges with prejudice. They are especially ap-
propriate where the reliability of the verdict is not at stake, but
the violation is nonetheless serious (e.g., violations of the right
to a speedy trial or the right to privacy, intentional delay in the
disclosure of evidence, and certain violations of the right to
counsel).172
In such cases, sentence reductions could be used to con-
demn, punish, and deter prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecu-
tors care not simply about obtaining a conviction, but also
about the sentences imposed on defendants.173 As Sonja Starr
has argued persuasively in the American context, "prosecutors
have many reasons to prefer longer sentences: political pres-
sures, ideology, office policy and culture, and career inter-
ests."174 Some of the same factors apply at international courts,
where prosecutors have frequently appealed sentences per-
ceived as too lenient.175 Finally, even prosecutors who are not
greatly concerned with the length of sentences still have a rea-
son to dislike sentence reductions because they "would face
embarrassment if a sentence were reduced on the express ba-
sis of [their] wrongdoing."176
Even more than prosecutors, defendants care about the
length of their imprisonment. A sentence reduction therefore
provides concrete and desired relief to convicted defendants
171. Chraidi v. Germany, App. No. 65655/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 26,
2006), 11 24-25, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?
i=001-77694.
172. See Sonja Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Miscon-
duct, 97 GEo. L.J. 1509, 1519 (2009).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1513.
175. E.g., Jennifer J. Clark, Note, Zero to Life: Sentencing Appeals at the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 96 GEO. L.J.
1685, 1710 (2008).
176. Starr, supra note 172, at 1513.
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whose rights have been violated.177 More broadly, such reduc-
tions have an expressive function, sending a message that the
international court will not tolerate misconduct by its own of-
ficers. In these ways, sentence reductions promote the goals of
ensuring fair trials at the ICC and strengthening respect for
the rule of law. 178
In addition to punishing misconduct effectively, sentence
reductions are typically consonant with the main goals of inter-
national criminal justice. Because the ICC is still able to adju-
dicate the case fully on the merits, it is not prevented from
punishing and deterring international crimes, uncovering the
truth about these crimes, or helping victims obtain redress.
Guilty defendants do not avoid punishment altogether, as they
might if the court ordered a more drastic remedy. In short,
sentence reductions are flexible and capable of accommodat-
ing diverse penological goals.
ICC judges could use sentence reductions to address vari-
ous types of misconduct at both the trial and pre-trial stages.
To make the use of reductions more consistent, judges could
establish guidelines on their application. The court could
specify types of misconduct for which sentence reductions
would be particularly appropriate. 79 The guidelines could
also outline cases for which reductions would not be a suitable
remedy-for example, to remedy grievous misconduct that un-
dermines the reliability of the conviction, 80 or conversely, to
remedy minor procedural violations. The guidelines could fur-
ther lay out factors that should be considered in calculating
the sentencing reduction, including the harm to the defen-
dant, the nature of the rights violated, and the culpability of
the prosecutor for the misconduct.' 8 '
177. E.g., Calabresi, supra note 145, at 116. For those who are acquitted,
financial compensation may be available. See infra Section IV.A.4.
178. Starr, supra note 172, at 1513.
179. For examples of violations for which sentencing reductions might be
appropriate, see supra text accompanying note 172.
180. Starr, supra note 172, at 1519-20 ("Sometimes, dismissal of charges,
mistrial, or appellate reversal may be necessary to avoid a risk of wrongful
conviction. Sentence reduction would be plainly inadequate to serve this
purpose . . . at least not as the sole remedy, when prosecutorial misconduct
undermines the court's confidence in the factual validity of the convic-
tion.").
181. See id. at 1519.
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Sentence reductions are not a perfect remedy, however,
and their drawbacks must be taken into account when decid-
ing whether they offer a better alternative to other available
remedies. In at least some cases, in which aging defendants are
sentenced to life imprisonment, a sentence reduction will not
be particularly meaningful, since a reduction to 35 or 45 years
would still effectively be a life sentence. In such cases, the com-
pensatory value of a reduction, and thus its potential to vindi-
cate individual rights, is likely to be insignificant. For the same
reason, the deterrent value vis-i-vis prosecutors is likely to be
slight and would consist primarily in the symbolic condemna-
tion of the prosecutor's conduct.182
At the ICC, however, this may not be as serious a problem
as it has been at other international tribunals. Whereas the
ICTR has regularly imposed life imprisonment, at the ICC, life
imprisonment is supposed to be used only in exceptionally
grave cases.183 The maximum sentence at the ICC is otherwise
set at 30 years.' 84 Consequently, at the ICC, sentence reduc-
tions are likely to be more meaningful and more likely to deter
prosecutorial misconduct. To increase the deterrent effect of
such reductions, the court can specifically consider the life ex-
pectancy of the defendant in each case and determine
whether a sentence reduction would amount to a meaningful
remedy.
While reductions may in some cases be too small to make
a difference, in other cases, they may be too generous and be
perceived as an unjustified windfall for the defendant. Courts
must therefore be cautious not to grant reductions that inter-
fere with the purposes of punishment. If the sentence post-
reduction seriously underrepresents the defendant's culpabil-
ity, it can dilute the expressive value of punishment and un-
dermine the retributive and deterrent functions of interna-
tional criminal justice.
182. The court could find complementary remedies to enhance the com-
pensatory and deterrent value of sentencing reductions in such situations,
for example, by ordering better detention conditions for the accused. I
thank Sonja Starr for this suggestion.
183. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 77(1) (b) ("[The Court may impose
life imprisonment] when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and
the individual circumstances of the convicted person.").
184. Id. art. 77(1) (a).
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While these concerns are valid, judges can address them
by employing proportionality analysis at sentencing. Before
imposing a sentence reduction, the court could confirm that
the ultimate sentence does not significantly underrepresent
the defendant's blameworthiness. National courts already use
a similar analysis to ensure that discounts awarded for guilty
pleas do not result in sentences that are disproportionately
low.s8 5 The same proportionality test could be used in the con-
text of discounts granted to remedy prosecutorial misconduct.
In determining the length of the sentence, courts would
be mediating between competing goals. On the one hand, a
longer sentence may better serve more traditional goals of
punishment, such as retribution, deterrence, and incapacita-
tion. On the other hand, sentence discounts may be justified
in the name of efficiency (in the case of guilty pleas) or as a
way to deter prosecutorial misconduct and affirm the rule of
law (in the case of remedial reductions). The Supreme Court
of Canada has justified remedial sentence reductions on just
such terms, as a means of promoting the goal of "respect for
the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe soci-
ety." 8 6Judges in Canada may therefore consider "not only the
actions of the offender, but also those of state actors . . .
[since] the sentencing process includes consideration of soci-
ety's collective interest in ensuring that law enforcement
agents respect the rule of law and the shared values of our
society."187
When ICC prosecutors violate the law in the performance
of their duties, a sentence reduction may similarly be justified
as a means of affirming the rule of law. To ensure that the
reduction is proportionate, the court would consider whether
the reduction helps punish misconduct and affirm respect for
the rule of law, without unduly sacrificing other goals of inter-
185. See, e.g., German Federal Court of Appeals, 2004 STRAFVERTEIDIGER
470 (holding that, when the expected post-trial sentence for tax evasion is
six years of imprisonment, a four-year sentence discount to reward a confes-
sion is disproportionate); German Federal Court of Appeals, 2008 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 170 (holding that the trial court impermissibly
coerced the defendant when it offered three and a half years of imprison-
ment in the event of a confession, and seven to eight years in the absence of
a confession).
186. R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, 1 39 (Can.).
187. Id. 1 49.
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national criminal justice, such as deterrence and retribu-
tion. 88
A different and somewhat unusual justification for sen-
tence reductions was offered by the Lubanga Trial Chamber in
its 2012 sentencing judgment. The Trial Chamber denied that
it was granting a sentencing reduction to remedy prosecutorial
misconduct.189 Instead, the Chamber asserted that the sen-
tence was reduced to reward the defendant's "respectful and
cooperative [conduct] throughout the proceedings, notwith-
standing some particularly onerous circumstances."190 The
"onerous circumstances" all had to do with prosecutorial mis-
steps: the failure to disclose exculpatory materials before trial;
the failure to comply with the court's orders to disclose the
identity of an intermediary; and the making of misleading
public statements about the evidence in the case.191 In short,
prosecutorial misconduct by itself was held not to be appropri-
ate grounds for a sentence reduction in Lubanga, but coopera-
tion by the defendant in the face of misconduct was.
It is difficult, however, to understand the reduction in
Lubanga as rewarding cooperation by the defendant. The de-
fendant did not refrain from filing motions to contest the
prosecution's misconduct. He did not admit guilt or cooperate
by providing information against other defendants. Instead,
his cooperation appears to have amounted to remaining re-
spectful and not boycotting the proceedings-something that
ought to be expected at criminal trials and hardly constitutes a
reason to reduce a sentence. While it is encouraging to see the
ICC granting sentence reductions to indirectly redress
prosecutorial misconduct, it would be preferable if these re-
ductions were openly and candidly defended as a means to
punish prosecutorial misconduct and affirm respect for the
rule of law.
188. See supra text accompanying note 185.
189. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sen-
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2. Dismissal of Select Counts
Another remedy that international criminal courts have
mentioned, but not yet used as a response to prosecutorial
misconduct is the dismissal or reduction of select counts
against the defendant. 192 Dismissals of individual counts have
been used to cure indictment defects, 93 so it is possible to im-
agine using the same remedy for other procedural violations
by the prosecution. Indeed, at the national level, some com-
mon-law jurisdictions already use dismissals in this fashion, to
cure violations beyond defects in the indictment.19 4 And al-
though courts often employ an all-or-nothing approach when
they dismiss charges, one could conceive of a more tailored
approach in cases of less grievous misconduct.
For example, in cases where the prosecution has withheld
or lost potentially exculpatory evidence critical to a particular
count, the court could remedy the misconduct by dismissing
or modifying that particular count, rather than dismissing the
indictment altogether. Indeed, in Prosecutor v. Lubanga, as the
Trial Chamber grappled with the prosecutor's refusal to turn
over exculpatory evidence obtained under confidentiality
agreements, the court suggested that a possible remedy would
be for the prosecutor to withdraw "any charges where non-dis-
closed exculpatory material has a material impact on the
Chamber's determination of the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused." 95
192. Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgment and Sen-
tence, 174 n.254 (Sept. 30, 2011) (citing Prosecutor v. Augustin
Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Decision on Defence Motions Alleg-
ing Violation of the Prosecutor's Disclosure Obligations Pursuant to Rule 68
(TC), 1 61-62 (Sept. 22, 2008)). The Trial Chamber mentioned dismissal
of charges as a potential remedy for late disclosure of exculpatory informa-
tion, but dismissed it as too extreme under the circumstances.
193. E.g., Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgment, 11
33, 35, 40, 42-45 (July 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos.
ICTR-96-IOA and ICTR-96-17A, Judgment, 11 59, 84-85, 470-72 (Dec. 13,
2004).
194. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (holding that courts
may vacate select counts as a remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel);
United States v. Lyons, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (dismissing
select counts as a remedy for prosecutor's failure to comply with disclosure
obligations); Henning, supra note 156, at 750.
195. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-)1/04-01/06, Decision on the
Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Arti-
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Typically, dismissals of particular counts will result in
lower sentences, so the advantages and disadvantages of dis-
missals are quite similar to those of sentence reductions. They
offer courts the flexibility to provide a remedy that is both con-
sistent with the public interest in prosecution and effective at
deterring prosecutorial misconduct.
Another reason why partial dismissals may be a useful re-
medial alternative in some cases is that they may have a sym-
bolic value that sentence reductions do not. International
criminal defendants often care about the nature of the specific
charges against them, apart from any sentencing conse-
quences that the charges may carry. For example, where the
same conduct can be charged as either genocide or a crime
against humanity, defendants may value deeply a reduction of
the charges to crimes against humanity, because of the special
stigma that genocide charges impart.196 For the same reasons,
prosecutors themselves care about the nature of the charges
that they bring and would be deterred by the prospect of par-
tial dismissals.' 97
Additionally, partial dismissals can be granted at the pre-
trial stage and immediately after the violation has occurred
(for example, in cases where prosecutors have failed to pro-
vide potentially exculpatory evidence relevant to the count be-
ing dismissed). The immediacy of this sanction arguably
strengthens its deterrent effect.198 When granted during pre-
cle 54(3) (e) Agreements and the Application To Stay the Prosecution of the
Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Confer-
ence on 10june 2008, 1[ 6 (June 13, 2008). The Chamber noted further that
"[i]f the prosecution were in doubt as to whether or not any material falls
into this category ... it should be put before the Trial Chamber for its deter-
mination." Id. Because the prosecution was not able to comply with the latter
disclosure requirement, the Chamber eventually stayed the proceedings. See
supra text accompanying note 5. But since Lubanga was indicted on only two
counts, and the potentially exculpatory evidence pertained to both, a partial
dismissal would not have been feasible.
196. Nancy Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes:
The Limited Influence of Sentence Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 69, 119 (2006).
197. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AJudgment, 11
175-78 (Feb. 22, 2008) (discussing prosecutors' decision to appeal the ac-
quittal of forced marriage charges, presumably for symbolic reasons, in a
case where the defendant was convicted on alternative and equally serious
charges of sexual slavery).
198. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal
Deterrence?, 100 J. CIuM. L. & CIUMINOLoGY 765, 821 (2010) (discussing stud-
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trial, dismissals also obviate the need for either the defense or
the prosecution to present evidence related to the dismissed
charges. This is beneficial to both parties, but particularly to
the defense, which would be able to conserve its limited re-
sources and use them more effectively to challenge the re-
maining counts.199 The court is also likely to derive efficiency
gains from such early dismissals.
While beneficial to the parties and the court, partial dis-
missals also have several drawbacks. The primary disadvantage
of dismissals is that they may interfere with the goal of uncov-
ering the truth about the underlying crimes. When counts are
dismissed, related evidence is not presented at trial, which lim-
its the record and leaves victims with partial or even no re-
dress.
Dismissals may also conflict with the expressive function
of ICC prosecutions. As noted earlier, prosecutors often bring
particular charges to send a message-for example, to con-
demn sexual crimes during conflict or crimes discriminating
against a particular class of persons. 200 Dismissing symbolically
powerful charges could undermine the ability of international
prosecutions to express targeted condemnation and to rein-
force respect for particular legal norms.
In some cases, partial dismissals may also be too weak to
effectively punish and deter prosecutorial misconduct. For ex-
ample, partial dismissals that result in lengthy sentences may
not be particularly meaningful in the case of aging defendants.
In such cases, judges must either adjust the sentence further
or impose an additional sanction or remedy to strengthen the
effect of dismissals.
In addition, a broader concern remains about partial dis-
missals: that judges can easily circumvent them at sentencing.
ies showing that the likelihood and immediacy of punishment are in fact
more influential deterrent factors than the severity of punishment).
199. The prosecution is also less likely to benefit from partial dismissals
because it will typically already have largely gathered its evidence to support
the charges by then. Most of the work in gathering and organizing the evi-
dence will in fact have occurred before the confirmation of charges proceed-
ings.
200. Cf Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at
the International Criminal Cou, 33 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 265, 314 (2012) (sug-
gesting that the ICC prosecutor may have chosen to bring certain charges
because of their potential to express select global norms).
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ICC judges have broad sentencing discretion. There are no
sentencing maximums or minimums tied to particular
charges, so a dismissal of select counts might not translate into
a noticeable sentence reduction. Judges could easily grant a
partial dismissal and then thwart its effect by imposing the
same or nearly the same sentence they would have imposed
absent the dismissal.
In practice, however, this is unlikely to occur. Ifjudges are
reluctant to grant a meaningful remedy, they would simply re-
frain from dismissing any counts. It would be surprising if the
same judges who saw the need to dismiss counts in the first
place would then undermine their own decision by rendering
the dismissal virtually worthless at sentencing.
Like sentence reductions, partial dismissals are not a per-
fect remedy. They may interfere with the goal of uncovering
the truth, and they may lead to sentence reductions that are
either unduly generous or too slight to be meaningful. Courts
need to be sensitive to these shortcomings of dismissals and
order them only when other available remedies would be less
appropriate. The most fitting cases would be those where the
prosecutor has withheld or lost potentially exculpatory evi-
dence, which is relevant to only one or two counts and is not
significant in light of the size and complexity of the case.
3. Declaratoty Relief
Perhaps the most commonly awarded remedy in interna-
tional law is declaratory relief. Declaratory relief is an official
pronouncement by the court, establishing that misconduct has
occurred and that a particular party is at fault. It is the least
intrusive remedy that a court could order,201 because it allows
the breaching party to decide whether and how to remedy the
situation. 202
Not surprisingly, declaratory judgments have been used
widely at the domestic level, in civil-law and common-law sys-
tems, as well as at the international level. As Dinah Shelton
reports, "[d]eclaratory judgments are the remedy most often
sought and granted in inter-state litigation."203 At the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, too, remedies typically consist of
201. SHELTON, supra note 28, at 199.
202. Id. at 68.
203. Id. at 199.
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declaratory judgments.204 Even at the ICIY and ICTR, a mere
"warning" to prosecutors, accompanied by a declaration of the
violations committed, was the most commonly imposed rem-
edy for ethical and procedural violations by prosecutors.205
A declaratory judgment can have an important symbolic
effect of condemning the conduct in question. For prosecu-
tors, who are presumed to be officers of justice and to be act-
ing in good faith to honor their obligations, a mere declara-
tion by the court will often be sufficient to induce compli-
ance. 206 The court's judgment condemning particular actions
of prosecutors as unlawful can serve as a potent deterrent for
most prosecutors, who would not like to be called out publicly
by a court for failing in their obligation. As officers of the
court, prosecutors are particularly susceptible to shaming by
the court, especially since they are "repeat players" in the sys-
tem and are likely to appear before the same judges many
times. To strengthen the shaming effect, the court could even
consider naming the errant prosecutors in its judgment, par-
ticularly in cases where the misconduct was deliberate.207
In addition to sanctioning prosecutors, a declaration that
the defendant's rights were violated may also have a reparative
effect. The open recognition and condemnation of the viola-
tion can help restore the integrity of the proceedings in the
eyes of the public. Similarly, the defendant may derive satisfac-
tion from the official acknowledgement that a wrong was com-
mitted and from the public reprimand of the prosecutors.
While declaratory relief has an important role to play in
regulating prosecutorial behavior, there is no question that its
204. Id. at 201; Lorna McGregor, Are Declaratory Orders Appmpri ate for Con-
tinuing Human Rights Violations? The Case ofKhadr v. Canada, 10 Hum. Rs. L.
REv. 487, 487 (2010). By contrast, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has been more reluctant to use declaratory judgments, reasoning that
they are inadequate to remedy grave human rights violations. Id. at 488.
205. See Table of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Sanctions (on file with
author).
206. Cf SHELTON, supra note 28, at 199 (arguing that if a state "is commit-
ted to the rule of law, a declaratory judgment still should be effective to end
the violation and prevent similar breaches in the future").
207. Cf Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys To
Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1059, 1089-93 (2009)
(suggesting that shaming U.S. prosecutors, by listing their misconduct and
their names, could be an effective punishment and deterrent).
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deterrent effect is typically weaker than that of other remedies,
and its reparative effect is even more limited. For that reason,
it is important to limit the use of declaratory judgments to
cases where prosecutorial violations are minor and where the
prejudice to the defendant is insignificant or nonexistent. De-
claratory judgments are especially likely to be helpful in cases
where prosecutors' actions violated the rights of third parties,
but did not harm the defendant. In at least some domestic
systems, declaratory relief is used in just such circumstances-
when the rule violated "does not purport to protect the inter-
ests of the accused in the criminal trial," or when the rights of
a third party, but not the accused, were breached. 208
4. Compensation to Acquitted Defendants
Although sentence reductions and partial dismissals may
be useful remedies in cases where the defendant is ultimately
convicted, they will not be feasible in cases of acquittal. In
practice, acquittals are likely to be rare at the ICC, just as they
were at the ICTY and ICTR. But if prosecutors committed mis-
conduct in the case of an innocent defendant, and the miscon-
duct was not remedied before the verdict, the court must con-
sider whether a remedy in addition to the acquittal is war-
ranted.
The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR did not provide for
remedies in cases of acquittal, but the courts used their inher-
ent powers to order compensation for prosecutorial miscon-
duct in such cases. 209 At the ICC, the Statute specifically pro-
vides for compensation to wrongfully detained or convicted
persons.210 In addition, the court may order compensation "in
exceptional circumstances," where it "finds conclusive facts
showing that there has been a grave and manifest miscarriage
of justice," and where the defendant "has been released from
detention following a final decision of acquittal or a termina-
208. Marc Groenhuijsen, Illegally Obtained Evidence: An Analysis of New
Trends in the Criminal justice System of the Netherlands, in THE XIIITH WORLD
CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAw: THE BELGIAN AND DUTCH REPORTS, 91-114
(2008), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=92639.
209. Stuart Beresford, Redressing the Wrongs of the International justice System:
Compensation for Persons Erroneously Detained, Prosecuted, or Convicted by the Ad
Hoc Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 628 (2002). This is a key reason why com-
pensation was so controversial at the Tribunals.
210. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 85(1)-(2).
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tion of the proceedings for that reason."211 In determining the
amount of compensation, the court must take into account
"the consequences of the grave and manifest miscarriage of
justice on the personal, family, social and professional situa-
tion of the person filing the request."212
The desirability of awarding compensation to an acquit-
ted person is debatable. Acquittal itself may be the best way to
remedy procedural violations in the case of an innocent defen-
dant.213 Given the limited resources of the ICC-including for
reparations to victims of the serious crimes that the ICC adju-
dicates-it may also seem inappropriate to use it for compen-
sation to acquitted persons. Finally, there is a concern that
compensation may be awarded to persons who are actually
guilty, but whose guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.214
At the same time, a person tried before the ICC-even if
ultimately acquitted-is likely to be detained for several years,
ostracized as a war criminal, and possibly never quite able to
shed the stigma of prosecution. Even if defendants are acquit-
ted, therefore, they may deserve compensation for the substan-
tial loss of liberty they suffered as a result of their lengthy pre-
trial detention, if it can be shown that their detention or trial
rights were adversely affected by prosecutorial errors or wrong-
doing.21 5 In addition to the harms suffered by defendants, the
integrity of the international criminal justice system is seriously
harmed when an innocent person is prosecuted as a result of a
"grave and manifest miscarriage of justice."
The high threshold for compensation, requiring that a se-
rious miscarriage of justice has occurred, is unlikely to pro-
duce compensation to factually guilty persons. But to avoid
any concern about using the court's scarce resources to pay
211. Id. art. 85(3).
212. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Adopted by the Assembly of
States Parties, R. 175, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 3-10, 2002) [hereinafter ICC
Rules of Procedure and Evidence], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/F1EACC-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/RulesLoL
procedure-andEvidence English.pdf.
213. Beresford, supra note 209, at 628.
214. Id. at 635; Johan David Michels, Compensating Acquitted Defendants for
Detention Before International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT'L Clum. JusT. 407, 419
(2010).
215. Beresford, supra note 209, at 643.
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factually guilty defendants, the court may expressly take into
consideration the likelihood of factual guilt in determining
whether and how much compensation to award. Similar com-
pensation schemes already exist in several domestic criminal
justice systems.216
In fact, at the domestic level, compensation schemes are
often broader than at the ICC-acquitted persons can receive
relief even without a showing that the prosecution has commit-
ted misconduct. 217 At the ICC, a defendant can claim com-
pensation only in cases of "grave and manifest miscarriage of
justice." Given the gravity of the misconduct at issue, compen-
sation seems particularly well-justified at the ICC. The court
must find a way to unequivocally condemn serious injustice
caused by its own officials. Acquittal is an indispensable first
step, but compensation remains a key complementary remedy
in these extraordinary cases.
B. Expanding the Use of Sanctions
Although a key function of remedies is to punish and de-
ter prosecutors who violate the law, remedies can do so only
indirectly and imperfectly. To curb prosecutorial misconduct
more effectively, the ICC must also develop a robust sanctions
regime. Sanctions are particularly useful because they can be
designed to deliver punishment directly to the erring prosecu-
tors and therefore can have a greater deterrent effect than
remedies. Compared to remedies, they are also typically less
costly to the international community's interests because they
do not end or suspend prosecutions and trials or interfere
with the truth-seeking function of the court.2 18
216. Michels, supra note 214, at 420-21 (discussing Norwegian, Dutch,
Austrian, and Danish law).
217. See id at 413 (listingjurisdictions in which an acquitted accused may
be compensated even where there has been no violation of her rights nor a
miscarriage of justice); see also UGOLOVNo-PROTSESSUAL'NY KODEKs Rossus-
KOI FEDERATSII [UPKRF] [Criminal Procedure Code] art. 133 (Russ.), trans-
lated at http://legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes
(same).
218. Sanctions are not cost-free, of course. Fines on the Office of the Pros-
ecutor decrease the resources that would be devoted to investigations and
prosecutions. Other sanctions, such as suspension, dismissal, or disqualifica-
tion of prosecutors, may in some cases overdeter and reduce the zeal with
which prosecutors perform their tasks. But these costs are much lower and
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The Rome Statute provides for several types of sanctions,
including disqualification, sanctions for misconduct before the
court, prosecution for offenses against the administration of
justice, and removal and discipline by the Assembly of States
Parties. Although the ICC has not imposed any of these sanc-
tions yet, it has recognized their potential as a less costly and
more effective alternative to remedies. 219 The Assembly of
States Parties has also shown increased interest in this subject
and recently created a self-standing oversight mechanism,
which would have the authority to investigate prosecutorial
misconduct.220
In many cases, sanctions could deter prosecutorial mis-
conduct more effectively than remedies and do so at a lesser
cost to the objectives of the ICC. But sanctions can sometimes
be so heavy as to overdeter prosecutors. They can also be mis-
used by political bodies to interfere with prosecutorial inde-
pendence. Therefore, in designing sanctions, the ICC must be
careful not to vest too much discretion over sanctions in a po-
litical body and not to impose sanctions that are so harsh as to




The Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor may be disquali-
fied from a case by the Appeals Chamber for, among other
reasons, the "[e]xpression of opinions, through the communi-
cations media, in writing or in public actions, that, objectively,
could adversely affect the required impartiality of the person
concerned." 221
more evenly spread than the costs of many remedies, which suspend or end
an entire prosecution.
219. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 18, Judgment
on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of
8 July 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Vari-
ation of the Time-Limit To Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Al-
ternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the
VWU," I1 59-60 (Oct. 8, 2010).
220. A.S.P. Res., Independent Oversight Mechanism, Resolution ICC-
ASP/8/Res.1, I 1 (Nov. 26, 2009).
221. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 212, R. 34(1) (d).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2332012]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
Although this sanction has not been used so far at the
ICC, the former prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, and some
of his staff were criticized for inappropriate public statements
relating to the cases against Sudanese President Omar Al-
Bashir and against Congolese militia leader Thomas
Lubanga.222 A motion for disqualification was also filed by one
of the suspects in the investigation of Kenyan post-election vio-
lence.223 The Pre-Trial Chamber refused to entertain the mo-
tion to disqualify the prosecutor, however, because Rule 34
specifies that only the Appeals Chamber is competent to ad-
dress such a motion. 224
Because only the Appeals Chamber is authorized to im-
pose disqualification, and given the rather serious effect of this
sanction on the case, it is not likely to be used frequently. But
disqualification should not be overlooked, as it can be an ef-
fective complement to warnings and sanctions under Article
71 when a prosecutor makes multiple inappropriate com-
ments about ongoing proceedings.
b. Sanctions for Misconduct Before the Court
Although the Rome Statute does not provide for "con-
tempt of court" measures, Article 71 provides for a similar
power of the court to deal with misconduct before it. If a per-
son is disrupting the proceedings, the court may give a warn-
ing; if the disruption continues, the person may be asked to
leave or be removed from the courtroom.225 If a person delib-
erately refuses to comply with a direction of the court, "and
that direction is accompanied by a warning of sanctions in case
of breach, the Presiding Judge of the Chamber dealing with
the matter may order the interdiction of that person from the
proceedings for a period not exceeding 30 days or, if the mis-
conduct is of a more serious nature, impose a fine." 226 Before
222. See Milan Markovic, The ICC Prosecutor's Missing Code of Conduct, 47
TEX. INT'L L.J. 201, 229-32 (2011).
223. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision on
Application for Leave To Participate Under Articles 58, 42(5), (7)-(8) (a) of
the Rome Statute and Rule 34(1) (d) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, 11 7-8 (Feb. 18, 2011).
224. Id.
225. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 71; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, supra note 212, R. 170.
226. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 212, R. 171.
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imposing sanctions under Article 71, the court is supposed to
give the offender a warning and the opportunity to be
heard.227
Sanctions can be imposed only on persons present before
the court, so some commentators have argued that the article
does not apply to conduct occurring before the court con-
venes or after it adjourns. 228 But decisions of the ICC have in-
terpreted the Article more broadly to cover even actions
outside the courtroom if they disrupt or prejudice ongoing
proceedings.
The court has on several occasions referred to its powers
to impose sanctions under Article 71, although it has not used
these powers yet. When the court found that an employee of
the Office of the Prosecutor had made prejudicial statements
to the press, it expressed the "strongest disapproval of the con-
tent of th [e] interview" and warned that "if objectionable pub-
lic statements of this kind are repeated the Chamber will not
hesitate to take appropriate action against the party responsi-
ble."2 2 9 The Court was likely referring to its powers to sanction
under Article 71. Although the objectionable behavior did not
occur before it, it was seen to prejudice the ongoing judicial
proceedings and was therefore potentially subject to sanctions
under Article 71.
Similarly, after the Prosecutor refused to comply with a
court order to reveal the identity of an intermediary who had
worked with the Office of the Prosecutor, the Lubanga Trial
Chamber warned the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor that
they would be sanctioned under Article 71, should they con-
tinue to breach the Chamber's orders.2so But because the or-
der in question was being appealed, the Chamber "decided to
227. Otto Triffterer, Article 71: Sanctions for Misconduct Before the Court, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: OBsERVERS' NoTEs, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 109, at 1347,
1353, 1357.
228. Id.
229. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Press Interview with Ms Le Fraper du Hellen, 1[ 53 (May 12, 2010), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc870208.pdf.
230. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 18, Judgment
on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of
8 July 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Vari-
ation of the Time-Limit To Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Al-
ternatively To Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the
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await the outcome of the appeal ... before taking any further
action with respect to imposing sanctions." 231
On appeal, the court held that sanctions under Article 71
are the preferred measure to employ in the case of a refusal by
the prosecution to obey court orders. According to the Ap-
peals Chamber, such sanctions are well-suited to inducing
compliance with the court's orders because, if the misconduct
continues, the court could impose a new fine on each day that
the misconduct continues. 232 Presuming that such hefty fines
would spur obedience by the prosecution, the Appeals Cham-
ber concluded that sanctions under Article 71 (rather than a
stay of the proceedings) are "the normal and proper means"
to ensure the prosecutor's compliance.233 They can restore the
court's ability to ensure a fair trial and are less disruptive than
a stay of the proceedings, the measure initially ordered by the
Trial Chamber. 234
While sanctions under Article 71 offer a promising means
of punishing and deterring prosecutorial misconduct, the cur-
rent scheme is problematic in two respects. First, Article 71's
scope, even if interpreted liberally, is quite narrow. The court's
authority to impose sanctions on prosecutors is limited to in-
stances of disobeying court orders and disrupting the proceed-
ings. Many serious and frequent infractions, such as disclosure
violations, appear to be excluded.
To enhance the effectiveness of its response to
prosecutorial misconduct, the ICC should be able to impose
VWU," 1 17 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947768.
pdf.
231. Id.
232. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 212, R. 171(4).
233. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 18, Judgment
on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of
8July 2010 Entitled "Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Vari-
ation of the Time-Limit To Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Al-
ternatively To Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the
VWU," 159 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947768.
pdf.
234. Despite the Appeals Chamber's call for sanctions as the preferred
measure for the prosecutor's misconduct, the Trial Chamber never imposed
the measure, as the prosecutor disclosed the intermediary's identity after the
decision by the Appeals Chamber. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/
04-01/06-T-316-ENG, Status Conference 21 (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc951429.pdf.
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sanctions for any procedural violation that is committed in
connection to proceedings before the court. This would in-
clude any substantial violation of the Statute, the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence, and the Regulations of the Court, as
long as the violation is connected to ongoing court proceed-
ings. For example, the court should be able to impose Article
71 sanctions for disclosure violations. While this may be a
broad reading of Article 71, it is consistent with the court's
duty to ensure the fairness of the proceedings.
Another problem with the current sanctions scheme con-
cerns the funds from which fines would be paid and the fund
in which they would be deposited. Currently, it is unclear
whether fines for prosecutorial misconduct would be drawn
from the general fund for the court or from the fund dedi-
cated specifically to prosecutions. If the sanctions are drawn
from the general fund, prosecutors would have little financial
incentive to avoid violations. To enhance the deterrent value
of fines, the money ought to be taken from a fund specifically
dedicated to the Office of the Prosecutor and transferred to
the defense fund of the court, which supports the Office of
Public Counsel for the Defense, counsel appointed for indi-
gent defendants, and defense investigations. This would en-
sure both that prosecutors have an incentive to avoid sanctions
and that the funds are used to advance the court's goal of pro-
viding fair trials.
The court should not only impose fines more frequently,
but also make use of the other type of sanction provided by
Article 71 for refusing to obey court orders: interdicting the
violator from the proceedings for a period not exceeding
thirty days. Unlike fines, interdiction can typically be imposed
swiftly and directly on the person responsible for the violation
(other prosecutors, who were not responsible for the violation,
could continue to present the case before the court). Because
of its very public nature, interdiction from the court is likely to
have a strong shaming effect. For all these reasons, it can be a
useful measure to punish and deter individual prosecutorial
misconduct, without imposing any significant costs to other le-
gitimate goals of international criminal justice.
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2. Administrative Sanctions
As discussed in the previous Section, court-imposed sanc-
tions can be very effective thanks to their immediacy. In prac-
tice, however, judges will not be able to devote significant time
or resources to the investigation of each instance of
prosecutorial misconduct. Administrative sanctions are there-
fore an important complement to court-imposed sanctions.
Administrative mechanisms are frequently used to sanc-
tion prosecutors in domestic criminal justice systems. Com-
mon-law systems typically rely on bar associations to apply ad-
ministrative discipline.235 At the international level, no
equivalent body exists. Instead, the administrative measures
discussed here, imposed by the ICC's Assembly of States Par-
ties and the newly created Independent Oversight Mechanism,
are more akin to the disciplinary mechanisms of civil-law sys-
tems. In these systems, prosecutors are subject to internal disci-
pline for minor infractions. For violations that warrant more
serious sanctions, prosecutors may be judged by special disci-
plinary tribunals comprised of professional judges and prose-
cutors.23 6
Given the prevalence of administrative discipline at the
national level, one might expect it to work well at the ICC, too.
But as the following sections discuss, administrative sanctions
can be used inconsistently and in a political fashion, so any
administrative model of prosecutorial discipline must be de-
signed carefully to minimize these dangers.
235. E.g., Keenan et al., supra note 3, at 234-40. In recent years, however,
England, Scotland, Australia and New Zealand have moved away from reli-
ance on self-regulation in the legal profession, establishing disciplinary
schemes that rely on legal services commissioners or boards. Judith L.
Maute, Bar Associations, Self-Regulation and Consumer Protection: Whither Thou
Goest?, 2008 J. PROF. LAw. 53, 55, 73-76 (2008).
236. E-mail from Thomas Weigend, Professor of Law, University of Co-
logne, to author (Aug. 5, 2011, 4:16 CST) (on file with author) (discussing
the German disciplinary regime); see also RICHTERGESETZ FOR DAS LAND
NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN [SGV. NRW.] UUDICIARY AcT FOR THE STATE OF
NORTH RHINE-WESTPHAuA], Mar. 1966, LANDSRICHTERGESETZ [LRiG] 29
§ 47, 66, 67; DisZIPLINARGESETZ FOR DAS LAND NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN [SGV.
NRW.] [DiscipLiNARY CODE FOR THE STATE OF NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA],
Nov. 2004, LANDESDISZIPLINARGESETZ [LDG NRW] 16, § 34, 35.
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a. Removal and Disciplinary Measures by the Assembly of
States Parties
The Statute and the Rules provide for disciplinary mea-
sures against the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor in cases of
serious misconduct, serious breach of duty, and misconduct of
less serious nature. These individuals may be removed from
office, reprimanded, or fined for engaging in such miscon-
duct. The provisions on removal and discipline, like those on
disqualification, deal only with the two highest-ranking mem-
bers of the Office of the Prosecutor. Other attorneys and staff
members are not included.
The Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor may be disci-
plined for misconduct occurring in the course of their official
duties if it is "incompatible with official functions, and causes
or is likely to cause serious harm to the proper administration
of justice before the Court or the proper internal functioning
of the Court."2 7 By way of example, the Rules suggest that
serious misconduct would occur if the prosecutor discloses in-
formation that she has acquired in the course of her duties or
on a matter which is under consideration by the court "where
such disclosure is seriously prejudicial to the judicial proceed-
ings or to any person."238 The other two examples involve seri-
ous misconduct for personal benefit.23 9
A prosecutor would commit a "serious breach of duty" if
she "has been grossly negligent in the performance of ... her
duties or has knowingly acted in contravention of those du-
ties." 2 4o The Rules provide two examples of such breaches: fail-
ing to request to be excused from a case, when knowing that
there are grounds for doing so; and repeatedly causing unwar-
ranted delays in the prosecution of cases. 241 The Prosecutor
and Deputy Prosecutor may be removed from office if they en-
gage in serious misconduct or serious breach of duty.2 4 2
237. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 212, R. 24(1) (a).
238. Id. R. 24(1) (a) (i).
239. Specifically, "(ii) Concealing information or circumstances of a na-
ture sufficiently serious to have precluded him or her from holding office;"
and "(iii) Abuse ofjudicial office in order to obtain unwarranted favourable
treatment from any authorities, officials or professionals." Id. R. 24(1) (a).
240. 1 R. 24(2).
241. Id R. 24(2)(a)-(b).
242. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 46.
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Less serious misconduct may be found when the prosecu-
tor's action "causes or is likely to cause harm to the proper
administration ofjustice before the Court or the proper inter-
nal functioning of the Court, such as "[r]epeatedly failing to
comply with or ignoring requests made by the Presiding Judge
or by the Presidency in the exercise of their lawful author-
ity."2 43 The Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors may be fined
or reprimanded for engaging in less serious misconduct.
Complaints identifying misconduct must be transmitted
to the Presidency of the Court, which may also initiate pro-
ceedings itself. The Presidency will review complaints with the
help of three judges and will set aside anonymous or mani-
festly unfounded complaints. 244 Any remaining complaints
concerning the Prosecutor will be sent to the Bureau of the
Assembly; those concerning the Deputy Prosecutor will go to
the Prosecutor.245 The decision to discipline the Prosecutor
must be made by an absolute majority of representatives in the
Assembly. In the case of misconduct by the Deputy Prosecutor,
the Assembly can decide on removal and fines, but only upon
the recommendation of the Prosecutor.246 Finally, the Prose-
cutor alone makes the decision to reprimand her Deputy for
misconduct.247
While removal of the Prosecutor is a serious measure that
is likely to be used only in extraordinary circumstances, repri-
mands and fines of the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor can
be applied somewhat more broadly. These measures do not
alter the result of judicial proceedings and would not directly
undermine the goals of punishing international crimes and
uncovering the truth.
But the disciplinary measures are not without shortcom-
ings. First, they can only be imposed on the Prosecutor and
Deputy Prosecutor and therefore cannot address misconduct
by line prosecutors. Second, they require an absolute majority
vote in the Assembly of States Parties, which means that some
misconduct may remain unpunished because of a failure to
243. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 212, R. 25(a).
244. Id. R. 26; Regulations of the Court ICC-BD/01-01-04, Reg. 120
(2004).
245. Regulations of the Court ICC-BD/01-01-04, Reg. 121(2) (2004).
246. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 46(2).
247. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 212, R. 30(3) (a).
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muster the requisite agreement in the Assembly. Conversely,
the Assembly may use these disciplinary measures inappropri-
ately and for political reasons-for example, to punish prose-
cutors for pursuing unpopular cases. 2 48 Such intervention can
seriously undermine the independence and effectiveness of
ICC prosecutors, ultimately jeopardizing the ability of the ICC
to accomplish its goal to prevent impunity for international
crimes.
b. Investigations by the Independent Oversight Mechanism
In an important recent development, the Assembly of
States Parties created an Independent Oversight Mechanism
(IOM) to investigate misconduct by prosecutors, judges, court
staff, and contractors retained by the court.2 4 9 The IOM is not
yet fully operational, although it is expected to begin work at
some point in the next year. The IOM would have the power
to investigate misconduct by both top officials and staff mem-
bers of the Office of the Prosecutor (as well as judges, the Reg-
istrar, and staff members of the Chambers and the Registry).
Misconduct includes "any act or omission . .. in violation of
[the staff member's] obligations to the Court pursuant to the
Rome Statute and its implementing instruments, Staff and Fi-
nancial Regulations and Rules, relevant administrative issu-
ances and contractual agreements, as appropriate."250
Before commencing an inquiry into the conduct of a
member of the Office of the Prosecutor, the IOM will notify
the Prosecutor that it has received information meriting the
248. The judicial referral mechanism-which is supposed to set aside
manifestly unfounded complaints-helps to minimize this concern, how-
ever. See supra text accompanying note 244.
249. The ASP established the Mechanism under Article 112(4) of the ICC
Statute, which provides that: "The Assembly may establish such subsidiary
bodies as may be necessary, including an independent oversight mechanism
for inspection, evaluation and investigation of the Court, in order to en-
hance its efficiency and economy." ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 112(4).
Some commentators have questioned whether the authority to discipline a
wide range of prosecutorial misconduct can be based on this grant of com-
petence to enhance the "efficiency and economy" of the court. The Proposed
Independent Oversight Mechanism for the International Criminal Court, Invited Ex-
perts on Oversight Question, UCLA IAw FORUM, (May-Sept. 2011), http://
uclalawforum.com/home (contribution by Nicholas Cowdery).
250. A.S.P. Res., Independent Oversight Mechanism, ICC-ASP/9/Res.5,
Annex, 2 n.2 (Dec. 10, 2010).
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inquiry.251 Investigations are to be conducted "with strict re-
gard for fairness and due process for all concerned;"252 the
specific procedures to ensure this will be included in the Op-
erations Manual that the IOM is set to issue later this year. If
the IOM concludes that the misconduct warrants criminal
prosecution, it will recommend referring the case to national
authorities.25 s But if it concludes that less than criminal mis-
conduct has occurred, it will recommend disciplinary mea-
sures to be taken by the Office of the Prosecutor. The ultimate
responsibility for imposing such measures will rest with the
Prosecutor, and the Prosecutor will have to report to the IOM
and the Assembly of States Parties on the measures taken.254 If
the Prosecutor continually ignores recommendations of the
IOM, the IOM can investigate the Prosecutor himself or her-
self for misconduct, and the Assembly of States Parties can im-
pose sanctions accordingly.255
The former Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, objected
to the competence of the IOM to investigate staff in his office
without his prior agreement. In a submission to the Assembly
of States Parties, he argued that such broad competence would
interfere with the statutorily enshrined independence of the
Office of the Prosecutor. Article 42 of the Rome Statute pro-
vides that "[t]he Office of the Prosecutor shall act indepen-
dently as a separate organ of the Court" and that "[a] member
of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any
external source."256 According to the Prosecutor's submis-
sions, these provisions suggest that the IOM cannot "instruct"
or demand cooperation with its investigations from
prosecutorial staff without the consent of the Prosecutor.257
Moreover, under Article 42, the Prosecutor has "full authority
over the management and administration of the Office, in-
cluding the staff, facilities and other resources thereof," which
251. The notification will not reveal the identity of the information
source. Id 1 18.
252. Id. 1 27.
253. Id. 31.
254. Id. 1 35.
255. A.S.P. Res., Independent Oversight Mechanism, supra note 250, at
annex, 1 24; ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 46.
256. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 42.
257. Report of the Bureau on the Independent Oversight Mechanism,
ICC-ASP/9/31, 44 (Nov. 29, 2010).
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reflects "the intention by the drafters to ensure full and unfet-
tered administrative independence of the Prosecutor."258
In view of the Prosecutor's objections, the Assembly of
States Parties revised the IOM's procedures. Under the new
provisions, whenever the ICC Prosecutor and the IOM disa-
gree as to whether investigations of prosecutorial staff should
proceed, an independent third-party will be brought in to re-
solve the dispute.259 The third party will decide whether the
investigation may undermine prosecutorial independence. If
so, the investigation would be suspended.
Despite this amendment, commentators continue to be
concerned that the Assembly of States Parties, through the
IOM, could use its disciplinary powers to interfere with the in-
dependence of the ICC Prosecutor for political reasons. 260
States parties unhappy with charging decisions of the Prosecu-
tor, for example, might use the oversight mechanism to harass
the Office of the Prosecutor, prevent the Office from devoting
full attention to prosecutions, and place pressure on the prose-
cutor to change her policies.261 To some degree, these con-
cerns have been accommodated through procedural and
structural safeguards, such as the recourse to an independent
third party. But it is still unclear what procedures the IOM will
adopt to ensure due process and confidentiality and how inde-
pendent the third-party arbiter will in fact be (since it will be
appointed by the Assembly of States Parties, some observers
worry its independence may not be entirely assured). 262
A better way to ensure that the IOM will not interfere with
the independence of the Office of the Prosecutor would be to
require any complaints about prosecutorial misconduct relat-
258. Id.
259. A.S.P. Res., Independent Oversight Mechanism, supra note 250, 11
20-25.
260. See The Proposed Independent Oversight Mechanism for the International
Criminal Court, Invited Experts on Oversight Question: UCILA LAw FORUM, (May-
Sept. 2011), http://uclalawforum.com/oversight (contributions by Jos6 Al-
varez, Nicholas Cowdery, and Harmen van der Wilt) (discussing how IOM
oversight could interfere with the operation of the ICC Prosecutor's Office).
261. Id. (contribution by Harmen van der Wilt); Michelle Coleman et al.,
Assessing the Role of the Independent Oversight Mechanism in Enhancing
the Efficiency and Economy of the ICC 51 (Universiteit Utrecht 2011), avail-
able at http://www.iilj.org/newsandevents/documents/IOMFinalPaperas
PublishedinOTPWebSite.pdf.
262. Coleman et al., supra note 261, at 6.
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ing to investigative and trial work to be referred or at least
vetted by ICC judges.263 The judicial referral mechanism
would prevent politically motivated investigations of prosecu-
tors from occurring, but would still allow valid complaints to
be investigated by the IOM. 26 4
Even if the judicial referral mechanism addresses the con-
cern about the IOM's potential politicization, another prob-
lem remains. The current structure of the IOM includes only
two staff members. Given that the IOM is supposed to investi-
gate complaints concerning not only prosecutors, but also
judges, the Registrar, staff members of the Chambers and the
Registry, and contractors, a two-member office seems inade-
quate to the task. Unless the IOM's capacity is expanded, the
Mechanism is likely to have only a limited role to play in moni-
toring ICC prosecutors.
In light of its currently limited resources, the IOM would
do best to direct its efforts to cases where it is likely to have the
most impact and where other sanctions and remedies are in-
sufficient. For example, the IOM could usefully investigate
complaints alleging that prosecutors knowingly or purpose-
fully violated the rules, but the defendant was not directly or
seriously harmed. Similarly, investigations would be helpful
where the prejudice to an individual defendant is minor, but
there is a pattern of misconduct by the Office of the Prosecu-
tor. In such cases, the court may be reluctant to impose any
meaningful remedies, because the harm to an individual de-
fendant is small. Action by the IOM would therefore be critical
to holding prosecutors accountable and deterring future viola-
tions.
c. Internal Discipline
Perhaps the most effective administrative sanctions are
those imposed within the Office of the Prosecutor. At the do-
mestic level, internal discipline is already used widely to police
prosecutors in civil-law countries and is increasingly seen as
263. This mechanism would be consistent with the framework for impos-
ing discipline on the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor under Article 46. See
supra text accompanying note 244.
264. In common-law countries, courts similarly refer prosecutorial miscon-
duct to disciplinary committees of bar associations. See, e.g., Keenan et al.,
supra note 3, at 234-40.
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key to reducing prosecutorial misconduct in the United
States.265
Internal sanctions work well because they are imposed di-
rectly on those prosecutors responsible for the violations and
take the form of punishments that prosecutors care about-
for example, salary reductions, suspensions, demotions, and
even termination. If imposed consistently, such punishments
send a clear message about the importance of following the
rules of the court. In addition, internal mechanisms such as
training and oversight programs play a critical role in prevent-
ing misconduct in the first place. So while judges, the Assem-
bly of States Parties, and the IOM all have an important role to
play in policing ICC prosecutors, the Office of the Prosecutor
will continue to bear the main responsibility for fostering a
culture of respect for the rule of law among its staff.
The Office of the Prosecutor already appears to have a
hierarchical structure with clear lines of control and several
levels of oversight, which would indicate that internal disci-
pline may work well in many instances.266 But anecdotal ac-
counts also suggest that the Office could do more to train and
regularly audit its personnel in proper investigative and disclo-
sure procedures. As others have argued persuasively, the Of-
fice must also develop a more detailed Code of Conduct to
guide its prosecutors. 267
265. For discussion of proposed or current internal mechanisms used to
regulate prosecutors in various offices across the world, see DAVID T. JOHN-
SON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 128-32
(2002); Barkow, supra note 3, at 895-905; Bibas, supra note 3, at 996-1015;
Coleman et al., supra note 261, at 56; Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecu-
tors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1413, 1478-79 (2010); James Q. Whit-
man, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. LEGAL
ANA..YSIs 119, 139 (2009).
266. Important management decisions are handled first by the head of
the respective division, then by the Executive Committee, and then by the
Prosecutor. See, e.g., Gregory Townsend, Structure and Management, in INTER-
NATIONAL PROSECUTORS 171, 287 (Luc Reydams et al. eds., 2012) (providing
an organizational chart of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor). Despite this
formal hierarchy, some in the Office of the Prosecutor have complained that
"OTP's management and management culture is lacking." Id. at 293.
267. Markovic, supra note 222. The Office of the Prosecutor has, however,
issued regulations that cover many questions pertaining to professional con-
duct. See International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Office of the Pros-
ecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdon-
lyres/FFF9711 1-ECD6-40B5-9CDA-792BCBE1E695/280253/ICCBD50109
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By strengthening its internal oversight mechanisms, the
Office can bolster its argument that external investigations,
such as those by the IOM, should be limited. Credible internal
discipline will also generally help improve the Office's reputa-
tion with judges and with the international community. Main-
taining a strong reputation with these two constituencies is
critical to ICC prosecutors' ability to function effectively.
Even an effective internal oversight program does not en-
tirely eliminate the need for external monitoring. First, inter-
nal discipline will not work when the violation of the rules is
condoned or ignored by supervisors. The main violations at
issue in Lubanga did not concern errant line prosecutors, but
involved a fundamental disagreement between the Office of
the Prosecutor and the court about how to interpret the Rome
Statute. In cases where the defendant has been seriously
harmed by the misconduct, moreover, internal discipline will
typically not be sufficient to repair the injury. While in-house
efforts have a role to play, it remains critical for the ICC itself
to develop a robust approach to policing prosecutorial miscon-
duct. The next Section elaborates a set of factors to help
judges decide whether and what remedies and sanctions to im-
pose for different types of misconduct.
C. Choosing Remedies and Sanctions
In response to misconduct, judges must decide two pre-
liminary questions. First, is a remedy or sanction warranted? If
yes, what remedy, sanction, or combination of remedies and
sanctions is most fitting? Under the balancing approach,
judges enjoy broad leeway in answering these questions. This
leads to concerns that judges would enact their own policy
preferences into law and erode individual rights. 2 68 The court
therefore needs a structured and disciplined approach that is
more protective of fundamental rights.
This Section proposes that the court develop a set of con-
crete factors that guide its analysis on whether and what rem-
edy or sanction to impose. The early ICC decisions offer some
guidance on what factors would be relevant. The court has
ENG.pdf. It is also revising its policies and Operations Manual and planning
to "clarify operational processes, reporting lines, and responsibilities." Town-
send, supra note 266, at 294.
268. E.g., Jackson, supra note 21, at 832.
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held that a stay of proceedings is reserved only for extraordi-
nary circumstances, where the prosecutor violated fundamen-
tal rights of the accused and a fair trial cannot be expected. 26 9
This holding indicates that the type of rights violated is a cen-
tral factor in the analysis. In deciding whether to exclude ille-
gally obtained evidence, the court has also examined the seri-
ousness of the procedural violation and its impact on the fair-
ness of the trial; the harm to the defendant's rights; and the
level of involvement by the prosecution. 270 By contrast, the
court has excluded from its analysis the gravity of the charged
offense. 27'
Building on this jurisprudence, this Section provides a
more concrete list of factors relevant to the choice of remedies
and sanctions. It also explains how these factors advance dif-
ferent goals of international criminal justice. Finally, taking a
cue from proportionality analysis used by constitutional courts
around the world, the Section suggests that the court should
always consider whether alternative remedies may be available,
which could advance legitimate goals of international criminal
justice, but at a lesser cost to individual rights and the integrity
of the judicial process.
1. Harm to the Defendant's Rights
Under existing ICC case law on remedies, harm to the de-
fendant's rights is a critical, albeit not determinative, factor.
National and international precedents similarly identify harm
or prejudice to the defendant as a critical element of the rem-
edy determination.
Prejudice is an obvious element in the balancing analy-
sis-the more serious the harm to the defendant, the more
there is to remedy. A potential difficulty arises with ranking
different defendants' rights as relatively more or less impor-
tant, but courts have proven capable of constructing such a
hierarchy. As part of its jurisprudence on prosecutorial mis-
conduct, the ICC has already begun categorizing certain rights
as belonging to the core of fair trial protections.272 Based on
269. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45, 79, 90.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 101-15.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
272. See supra text accompanying note 45. The ICIY has also attempted to
distinguish between egregious human rights violations, which warrant the
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this case law, we can already predict that, if prosecutors or
their agents coerce statements from the defendant or fail to
disclose exculpatory evidence, the remedy is likely to be quite
strict.278 By contrast, disclosing exculpatory evidence with only
a minor delay or making a public statement perceived as preju-
dicial would warrant a lesser remedy or sanction.274
The main principle guiding this assessment appears to be
whether the prosecutor's misconduct has increased the risk
that an innocent person might be convicted. Non-disclosure of
exculpatory evidence and coercion during interrogation may
heighten this risk, whereas mere delays in disclosure, privacy
violations, and potentially prejudicial public statements typi-
cally do not. Violations of the first type are therefore more
likely to warrant serious remedies. This approach toward mea-
suring the seriousness of the violation is consistent with hold-
ings by other international and domestic courts, which focus
on whether a particular rights violation has affected the overall
fairness of the proceedings. 275
Another element that the court should consider when
evaluating harm to the defendant is the timing of the viola-
tion. Certain violations, such as the failure to disclose exculpa-
tory evidence, can be more easily corrected if uncovered early
in the proceedings. In those circumstances, the court can
adopt an escalating approach, beginning with lesser remedies,
setting aside of the court's jurisdiction, and other violations, which trigger
an interest-balancing test. E.g., Prosecutor v. Nikolie, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73,
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest, 1 30 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 5, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/dragannikolic/acdec/en/030605.pdf (holding that the kidnapping
of the accused before transfer to the Tribunal was not such an egregious
human rights violation as to warrant setting aside the court's jurisdiction).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68, 195.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26, 83.
275. E.g., Panovits v. Cyprus, App. No. 4268/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 11,
2008), 1 66, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
90244. See generally JEREMY MCBRIDE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: THE CASE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2009),
available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/capacitybuilding/
Source/documentation/Echr-andcrimprocedure.pdf; see also Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (holding that to show a Brady violation
and receive a remedy, defendant must show that the undisclosed "favorable
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different
light as to undermine confidence in the verdict"); HM Advocate v. Higgins,
[2006] HCJ 05, 2006 S.C.C.R. 305 (Scot.).
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but shifting to stronger remedies if the prosecutor fails to com-
ply within a specified time.2 7 6 When the court has the opportu-
nity to address the violation before or during trial, the harm to
the defendant will often be less significant than if the violation
is uncovered after conviction. In these circumstances, the
court may choose a lesser remedy or even no remedy at all, if
the harm to the defendant has been fully repaired.
2. Harm to the Integrity of the Proceedings
Typically, prejudice to the defendant results in harm to
the integrity of the proceedings. It is also possible that the de-
fendant suffers no prejudice, yet the misconduct harms the in-
tegrity of the judicial process. At least one ICC Trial Chamber
has suggested that remedies would be available in these situa-
tions as well. 2 7 7
Many domestic jurisdictions deny relief when the defen-
dant was not personally harmed by the violation, on the rea-
soning that remedies are awarded primarily to vindicate indi-
vidual rights. 2 7 8 But the ICC's approach can be justified as a
means of advancing the broader goal of ensuring fair trials
and modeling respect for the rule of law. Even when the de-
fendant has not been harmed, remedies can be useful to pun-
ish and deter prosecutorial misconduct. By imposing remedies
even in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, the court
condemns the misconduct, restores judicial integrity, and ex-
presses its commitment to procedural fairness and
prosecutorial accountability. And at least when it comes to the
exclusion of evidence, this approach is also textually
grounded. Article 69(7) of the Rome Statute provides that a
violation which seriously endangers the integrity of the pro-
ceedings can result in exclusion of evidence; it does not re-
quire that the defendant's rights be directly harmed.
276. This is the approach that the ICC Appeals Chamber used to address
the prosecutor's failure to disclose potentially exculpatory information in
Prosecutor v. Lubanga. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14, 76-77.
277. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 37 Uune 24, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf.
278. E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978); Sabine Gless,
Truth or Due Process? The Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in the Crimi-
nal Trial (Germany) 10 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1743530; Groenhuijsen, supra note 208, at 2.
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The court is therefore correct to consider awarding reme-
dies when a violation does not prejudice the defendant's inter-
est, but harms the integrity of the proceedings. Consistent with
proportionality, judges can still adjust the type and level of
remedy to avoid an unjustified windfall to the defendant at the
expense of other important interests in the international crim-
inal justice system. A declaratory judgment, perhaps accompa-
nied by sanctions, would typically be an appropriate response
under the circumstances. It would acknowledge the violation,
provide some, albeit largely symbolic, relief, and, by disciplin-
ing the responsible prosecutors, also help deter future miscon-
duct.
3. Prosecutor's Culpability
Consistent with current decisions, the culpability of ICC
prosecutors should remain a factor in the court's analysis.
When a prosecutor deliberately flouts the rules, the court
should impose a more serious sanction or remedy than when a
prosecutor is acting negligently or in good faith. Factoring in
the prosecutor's mental state would help strengthen the deter-
rent effect of sanctions and remedies and thus promote the
ICC's goal of providing fair trials.279
Although culpability should remain a relevant factor, it
should not be dispositive. If prosecutors have acted in good
faith, this may be a mitigating factor in the selection of the
type of remedy, but should not by itself preclude the imposi-
tion of remedies. 280 If the defendant's rights have been seri-
ously prejudiced, a remedy may be necessary to ensure that
the defendant is not judged unfairly and to affirm the impor-
tance of fair trial rights.
At the same time, since good-faith and negligent mistakes
ought to be more easily deterred, the court can adjust the rem-
edy or sanction to reflect this. For example, where the viola-
tion of the defendant's rights is relatively minor and an iso-
279. E.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on
the Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 1 47 (June 24, 2009), http:/
/www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf.
280. Cf Jennifer Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in
Constitutional Criminal Procedur, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1002, 1022-24 (2010)
(explaining why, in criminal cases, U.S. courts have traditionally not consid-
ered the intent of government actors in determining remedies for constitu-
tional violations).
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lated incident (of, say, belated disclosure), declaratory relief
may be sufficient to respond to good-faith mistakes. By con-
trast, when prosecutors deliberately and systematically violate
defendants' rights, more drastic remedies, such as sentencing
reduction, exclusion of evidence, stay of the proceedings, or
retrial may be warranted. 281 The prosecutor's intent, there-
fore, should be considered alongside other factors, including
the seriousness of the violation, whether the violation was iso-
lated or systematic, and whether the prosecutor's office has
taken measures to prevent such violations from occurring in
the future.28 2
4. Prosecutor's Level of Involvement in the Violation
The level of prosecutorial involvement in the violation is
arguably also relevant to the remedy determination, although
the ICC has yet to clarify its position on this question. In the
Lubanga Admissibility Decision, the court held that the mere
presence of ICC investigators during an unlawful search by na-
tional authorities did not warrant exclusion of the evidence
obtained during the search because ICC investigators had no
control over the operation. Because there were "no indicators
that the [ICC] investigator controlled or could have avoided
the disproportionate gathering of the evidence, or that he ac-
ted in bad faith," there was no conduct by the ICC official that
could be disciplined or deterred.283 More broadly, the Trial
Chamber seemed to concur with the position of ICTY Trial
Chambers that "exclusionary rules. . . [at the international
level] were not intended to deter and punish illegal conduct
by domestic law enforcement authorities."284
By contrast, in Prosecutor v. Katanga, the court excluded
statements where national authorities, without any ICC in-
volvement or encouragement, had obtained statements from
281. See Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial Miscon-
duct, 26 AM.J. CluM. L. 121, 160-64 (1998) (arguing that courts should con-
sider whether prosecutors acted "with a conscious purpose to unfairly
prejudice a defendant").
282. See infra Section IV.C.5.
283. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 1 46 (June 24, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf.
284. 7d. I 45.
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the accused in violation of his right to counsel.285 The Rome
Statute did not expressly require that the accused be assisted
by counsel under the circumstances. 286 But the Trial Chamber
held that the accused's statements were obtained in violation
of international human rights law and this was a sufficient rea-
son to exclude them from the trial. The Chamber never dis-
cussed the wisdom of imposing a remedy for a violation for
which only national authorities-and not ICC prosecutors-
were responsible. Because the Chamber did not provide any
detailed reasons for its decision, it remains unclear how the
ICC would handle similar violations by national authorities in
the future.
The Lubanga Trial Chamber was more forthcoming in its
reasoning about prosecutorial contributions to rights viola-
tions, and future ICC decisions should build on it. As the
Lubanga Chamber recognized, the level of involvement by
prosecutors is relevant to the question of remedy because it
reflects the likelihood that a remedy will have a deterrent ef-
fect.28 7 A remedy may not need to be imposed at all where ICC
prosecutors did not encourage, order, or exercise control over
the actions of national authorities that violated the defen-
dant's rights, particularly where the violation was not very seri-
ous. There is no realistic prospect of deterring the conduct of
national authorities through the exclusion of evidence (and in
any event, the ICC has no mandate to do so),288 and yet exclu-
sion under the circumstances may unduly jeopardize impor-
tant goals of international criminal courts.
285. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Bar Table Motions, 11 57, 60, 62-63 (Dec. 17, 2010), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc987504.pdf.
286. Article 55(2) of the Statute requires such assistance only where the
accused is questioned by the ICC prosecutor or by national authorities on
the request of the ICC prosecutor. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 55(2). As
the Katanga decision acknowledges, "Article 55(2) does not impose procedu-
ral obligations on states acting independently of the Court." Prosecutor v.
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Prosecutor's Bar Table
Motions, 1 59 (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
987504.pdf.
287. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 46 (June 24, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf.
288. Id
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Therefore, if ICC prosecutors did not encourage, order,
or control the conduct of the national authorities, remedies
should be imposed only in exceptional circumstances, where
the violation is both antithetical to and threatens to seriously un-
dermine the integrity of the proceedings (for example, where
authorities used coercion to obtain statements from the ac-
cused). For less serious violations, remedies should either not
be imposed or should be limited to declaratory relief.2 8 9
5. Pattern of Misconduct
In determining the need for remedies and sanctions, the
court must consider whether misconduct was an isolated oc-
currence or part of a larger pattern. 290 A pattern of miscon-
duct is more likely to cause harm to the integrity of the judicial
system and to the defendant's rights. It is also more difficult to
deter because it implies deliberate indifference on part of the
Office of the Prosecutor toward correcting procedural viola-
tions by its staff.2 9 1
For that reason, more forceful remedies and sanctions
should typically be imposed when such a pattern is present.
Indeed, the court may well consider that significant remedies
should be imposed even in the absence of prejudice to the
289. Cf. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), Case No. 001/18-07/
2007/ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgement, 11 392-99 (Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/courtdoc/Case%20001AppealJudgementEn.pdf (in-
terpreting international law to require international criminal courts to pro-
vide a remedy for procedural violations only where there is either abuse of
process or involvement by officers of the international court).
290. In the United States, courts typically require a showing of a pattern of
misconduct to support a finding of civil liability for prosecutors who have
violated a defendant's constitutional rights. E.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131
S.Ct. 1350, 1360-61, 1366 (2011).
291. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366 n.2 (1981)
("[W] e note that the record before us does not reveal a pattern of recurring
violations by investigative officers that might warrant the imposition of a
more extreme remedy in order to deter future lawlessness."); United States
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 527 (1983) (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("If Government prosecutors have en-
gaged in a pattern and practice of intentionally violating defendants' consti-
tutional rights, a court of appeals certainly might be justified in reversing a
conviction, even if the error at issue is harmless, in an effort to deter future
violations.").
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defendant, because of the serious threat that a pattern of mis-
conduct presents to the integrity of the proceedings.
A finding that the misconduct was part of a series of viola-
tions should warrant sanctions that are not only more signifi-
cant, but also directed at the Office of the Prosecutor as an
institution. Hefty fines and referral of the violation to the IOM
may be warranted, in addition to remedies such as exclusion,
sentencing reduction, or even a stay, particularly if the re-
peated violations have harmed the defendant. Conversely,
milder sanctions would be warranted when the violation is an
isolated example or when the Office of the Prosecutor has im-
plemented concrete measures to prevent violations from re-
curring, for example, by disciplining the violators and institut-
ing better oversight and training programs within the Of-
fice.292
6. Probative Value of the Evidence
Another factor that would be relevant to at least one type
of remedy-exclusion-is the probative value of the evidence
being excluded. The Lubanga Trial Chamber refused to con-
sider this factor, because Article 69(7), pertaining to the exclu-
sion of evidence, did not specifically mention it.293 But Article
69(7) also fails to mention several other factors pertinent to
exclusion, which the Trial Chamber nonetheless considered in
its analysis. In these other instances, the Trial Chamber
adopted a purposive approach and considered factors that
were not listed in the Statute, but were reasonably related to
one or more of the court's central goals.
292. In the context of prosecutions of corporations in the United States,
courts frequently mitigate sanctions (and prosecutors often defer prosecu-
tion) if a corporation can show that it has implemented adequate compli-
ance mechanisms to prevent the violation from recurring. A similar ap-
proach with respect to violations by international prosecutors would likely
encourage better internal oversight by the Office of the Prosecutor itself.
Ultimately, such internal oversight is likely to be one of the most effective
means of preventing misconduct by prosecutors. See Rachel E. Barkow, Orga-
nizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor's Office, 31 CAIozo L. REv. 2089,
2106-12, 2118 (2010).
293. E.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICCA)1/04-01/06, Decision on
the Admission of Material from the "Bar Table," 1 43 (June 24, 2009), http:/
/www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc702244.pdf.
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A purposive analysis would place greater emphasis on the
probative value of the evidence as this would be consistent
with the goal of international criminal courts to obtain a more
complete and accurate record of the crime. As the ICTY ex-
plained in Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, "in situations of armed con-
flict, intelligence which may be the result of illegal activity may
prove to be essential in uncovering the truth; all the more so
when this information is not available from other sources."294
As long as admission would not seriously undermine the integ-
rity of the proceedings and the evidence is reliable, the Cham-
ber should be more likely to admit highly probative evidence
than evidence that is less relevant and useful to uncovering the
truth about the charged crimes.
In some instances, the probative value of the evidence
may work in favor of the defense and call for stronger reme-
dies for prosecutorial misconduct. For example, where the
prosecution has failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in a
timely fashion, and the evidence is highly probative of the de-
fendant's innocence, the court may draw a stronger negative in-
ference from this failure to disclose or even order additional
sanctions and remedies.
While consideration of the probative value of the evi-
dence is likely to advance the truth-seeking goals of the ICC, if
used frequently to restrict exclusion, it may reduce the deter-
rent effect of the ICC's exclusionary rule. As the next Section
discusses, to prevent this from occurring, the court should not
end the analysis by concluding that the evidence is very proba-
tive and exclusion is therefore inappropriate. Instead, the
court should consider alternatives to exclusion, such as sen-
tence reductions, fines, and disciplinary referrals, which would
still be compatible with the truth-seeking goals of the ICC, but
could also deter prosecutorial misconduct more effectively in
such instances.
7. Less Restrictive Measures
To ensure the fairness of the proceedings, the court must
consider whether the remedies it plans to impose sufficiently
294. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Defense
"Objection to Intercept Evidence," 1 61 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Forner
Yugoslavia Oct. 3, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/
031003.htm.
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vindicate the defendant's rights. To do so, judges can examine
whether alternative remedies exist which are less burdensome
on individual rights and more likely to safeguard the integrity
of the proceedings.
Consider again a court faced with a situation in which ICC
investigators violated the defendant's privacy rights during a
search in which they obtained very probative and reliable evi-
dence concerning crimes against humanity committed by the
defendant. The court may seek an alternative to exclusion be-
cause exclusion may harm the search for the truth about the
charged crime. Feasible alternative remedies include declara-
tory judgments, sanctions, and sentence reductions. Unlike ex-
clusion, these remedies would allow the court to examine
more fully the circumstances of the commission of the crime
and would not interfere with the court's truth-seeking func-
tion. But among these measures, sanctions and sentence re-
ductions are more likely to vindicate individual rights and safe-
guard the integrity of the judicial process. Under the less re-
strictive measures approach, therefore, the court would
ordinarily opt for sanctions and/or sentence reductions rather
than for a declaratory judgment.
Introducing this step in the balancing analysis can help
alleviate concerns that fundamental rights will be eroded. The
less restrictive measures approach demands that remedies are
restricted only as far as necessary, and no further, to accom-
plish a legitimate purpose. It requires the court to consider
openly the available alternatives and to explain why the mea-
sure it has chosen strikes an adequate balance between com-
peting interests. In this respect, the court would move beyond
"free balancing" and closer to the more structured proportion-
ality analysis used by constitutional and human rights courts
around the world. As others have remarked, it is precisely an
emphasis on less restrictive measures that makes a balancing
test such as proportionality more transparent, consistent, and
protective of individual rights.29 5
8. Transparent Balancing
In the final prong of the balancing test, judges should
weigh openly the competing rights and interests and justify
295. E.g., Jackson, supra note 21, at 831.
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which should prevail. When granting a more drastic remedy,
for example, the court would explain why individual rights
and commitment to rule of law outweigh other considerations.
Conversely, when the court orders a more modest remedy, it
would examine why public interests such as retribution, deter-
rence or truth-seeking are so pressing in a particular case that
they justify the lesser sanction. The very act of articulating and
justifying the balancing of interests would help discipline judi-
cial decision-making, and it would enhance the political legiti-
macy of the court's work.
The outcome of the balancing test may not always be
broadly accepted. The court may give undue deference to
goals that, over time, prove less central to international crimi-
nal justice than the court assumed them to be. But, as dis-
cussed at greater length in Section III.C, the strength of bal-
ancing lies in its transparency and inclusiveness, and judges
should emphasize these qualities in their reasoning. This
would allow for the jurisprudence of the court to mature as
the ICC engages in a reasoned dialogue with its various constit-
uencies, other courts, and the public.
V. CONCLUSION
In confronting prosecutorial misconduct, courts around
the world struggle to find the right balance between public
interests and individual rights. In their remedial decisions,
judges strive to deter misconduct and protect the integrity and
fairness of the proceedings. At the same time, they seek to
minimize the costs that remedies impose on other important
interests of the criminal justice system, such as retribution, de-
terrence, and the establishment of an accurate historical re-
cord.
At the ICC, this balance is even more difficult to attain.
Because of the gravity and systematic nature of international
crimes, the goals of preventing impunity, uncovering the truth
about the crimes, and respecting victims' interests are espe-
cially significant. The ICC will thus often be inclined to refrain
from providing remedies that would interfere with these goals.
Yet the ICC must remain committed to providing fair trials
and serving as a global model of criminal procedure. In ad-
dressing prosecutorial misconduct, the ICC must show that it
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can live up to its own ideals of accountability and the rule of
law.
The ICC's competing goals make the absolutist approach
to remedies a poor fit for international criminal procedure.
The court must find a way to accommodate its most significant
and legitimate interests without unduly restricting any of
them. A balancing analysis can help the court navigate this
challenging course. Under this approach, the court may limit
remedies if one of its key goals-for example, establishing an
accurate historical record-demands a restriction on remedies
for prosecutorial misconduct. But the court must always try to
impose the narrowest restriction needed to accomplish the
goal at hand.
To ensure that the balancing test is applied consistently,
the court must articulate specific factors that it will rely on.
These would include the harm the misconduct caused to the
defendant or to the integrity of the proceedings; the culpabil-
ity and involvement of ICC prosecutors in the violation; the
frequency of similar violations by the Office of the Prosecutor;
and the probative value of the evidence affected. By applying
these factors and adding others as new circumstances warrant,
the ICC can help make its balancing test more transparent and
predictable and ultimately more protective of individual rights
and the integrity of the justice system.
The ICC should correspondingly expand the range of
available remedies and sanctions. In each case, the court
should then select a remedy or sanction that is narrowly tai-
lored to the misconduct at hand and does not unduly burden
any of the court's significant goals. Accordingly, in addition to
excluding evidence, staying the proceedings, or dismissing the
case, the court should consider policing prosecutors through
sentence reductions, dismissals of select counts, fines, and re-
ferrals for discipline.
By expanding its responses to misconduct and applying a
well-defined balancing analysis, the ICC can achieve an ap-
proach to prosecutorial error that is both effective and able to
accommodate the competing interests of international crimi-
nal justice.
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